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PREFACE 
For certain elements within the highest echelons of 
the German Navy, planning for the possible, if not eventual, 
seizure of strategic bases in neutral Norway became imper­
ative with the outbreak of World War II. Especially vital 
for the German war effort were the protection of Swedish 
iron ore shipments to the Third Reich from the Norwegian 
port of Narvik and the denial of preponderant influence, 
or physical control, over Norway to any rival power. 
Tempered by contemporaneous diplomatic and military events, 
these strategic problems found their expression in planning 
for a projected invasion of Norway. 
How German naval planning was brought to fruition 
in Fall Weserttbung is the central focus of this thesis. 
Its dual purpose, however, is to assess those factors which 
influenced the successive stages of German strategic plan­
ning concerning Norway from September 1939 to April 1940 
and to evaluate the import of its final outcome. 
iii 
INTRODUCTION 
Examination of a large-scale, equidistant map of 
Northwestern Europe, the Greenland and Barents Seas, and 
the North Atlantic Ocean reveals not only the geographical 
position of Norway but also her strategic significance to 
a Hitlerian Germany excluded from the Belgian and French 
coasts during the winter of 1939-1940. World War I had 
demonstrated Great Britain's ability to ;^weep the seas 
free of German merchant shipping, to impede the egress of 
U-boats to the North Atlantic, and to restrict the German 
High Seas Fleet to the narrow confines of the North Sea 
by means of mine barrages and naval patrols in the English 
Channel and between the Shetland Islands and the south­
western coast of Norway. The former debouche was sealed 
off while the latter was finally closed late in 1918 when 
British pressure forced the Norwegian Government to 
complete the mine barrier by laying an anti-submarine 
minefield in its territorial waters off Karmtty. In order 
to achieve a degree of operational freedom after the 
beginning of World War II, the German Navy was compelled 
to break out from the geographical restrictions imposed by 
the British Isles' strategic position and the location of 
1 
2 
their own ports as well as to obtain naval bases beyond 
the "wet triangle." 
In 1929 Vice Admiral Wolfgang Wegener in 
Die Seestrateqie des Weltkrieges had offered a solution 
to these problems arising from Germany's geographical 
situation. He asserted that the maintenance of unimpeded 
access to the high seas for merchant shipping must be the 
principal function of a German fleet. Defense of "'the 
dead angle of a dead sea'"^ had not achieved this objec­
tive in World War I; and he believed that even the 
occupation of the western coast of Denmark would not have 
secured it although greater utilization of the Skagerrak 
and Kattegat could have "decisively improved" Germany's 
2 strategic situation. Consequently, an occupation of the 
"'Norwegian position,'" Wegener averred, "'was certainly 
preferable'" since 
'England could then no longer maintain the 
blockade-line from the Shetlands to Norway 
but must withdraw approximately to the line 
of the Shetlands-the Faeroes-Iceland. But 
this line was a net with very wide meshes. 
The North Sea coasts of Jutland and Northwestern 
Germany. Quoted in T. K. Derry, The Campaign in Norway 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952), 16. 
Hereafter cited as Derry, Campaign. 
2 Friedrich Ruge, Der Seekrieg (Annapolis, Maryland: 
United States Naval Institute, 1965), 79. Hereafter cited 
as Ruge, Der Seekrieg. 
3 
The fresh wind from the ocean then already 
blew from afar into the stifling atmosphere 
of the hunger-blockade.' 
He also concluded that this line would be difficult for 
Great Britain to defend because it would lie relatively 
near Norwegian bases "'but above all'" because Germany— 
through its occupation of Norway—would "'considerably 
3 outflank the English strategic position to the north.'" 
Even in 1939, however, Norway possessed few port 
facilities along her western littoral adequately devel­
oped and capable of handling German high seas units. 
Nevertheless, the Norwegian fjords offer innumerable 
deep-water refuges capable of sheltering the largest 
ocean-going vessels while the very nature of the glaci­
ated, U-shaped fjords can provide defensive protection 
for warships. A protective screen of offshore islands, 
the SkiaergSrd, parallels much of the Norwegian coastline 
breaking the force of Atlantic storms and the prevailing 
westerly winds while simultaneously offering protection 
to coastwise shipping which ply the deep channels between 
the islands and the shore. Moreover, the Norwegian 
Current, an extension of the warm North Atlantic Drift, 
produces ice-free conditions even at Knivskjelodden on 
Magerfly, Norway's northernmost point (71° 11' North 
3 Quoted in Derry, Campaign, 16. 
4 
4 Latitude), and at Kirkenes in Eastern Finnmark. The 
spring and summer fogs produced by the Norwegian Current 
as well as prolonged cloudiness in summer and autumn 
provide excellent cover for operational and tactical 
deception and the potent exercise of inferior naval power. 
On the other hand, Norway's road and rail net was markedly 
deficient in 1939-1940, especially when considering the 
supplying of advanced bases; and her rail system scarcely 
reached beyond Trondheim. 
Despite the natural protection afforded by the 
Skiaerqard to ships traversing the deep coastal channels 
of the Indreled, or Inner Leads, they could offer only 
limited protection from enemy submarines or light surface 
vessels but none at all from air raids if Norway became a 
belligerent power or Great Britain could overawe her 
neutrality. Nevertheless, it should be noted that it was 
only 240 air miles from Stavanger to Scapa Flow, 435 from 
Kristiansand to Edinburgh, and 170 from Bergen to the 
Shetlands.^ 
^Great Britain, Naval Intelligence Division, 
Norway (n. p.: January, 1942), 1. Hereafter cited as 
Naval Intelligence, Norway. 
^Ibid., passim. "Egersund" (Norway 1:100,000), 
Army Map Service, United States Army (Second edition, 
Washington, D. C., 1942). "Frfljen" (Norway 1:100,000), 
Army Map Service, United States Army (Washington, D. C., 
1943). "Ervik" (Norway 1:100,000), Army Map Service, 
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Consequently, possession of Norway's 1,700 mile 
long coastline^ by the Third Reich would outflank British 
maritime defenses, parry the establishment of minefields 
and a blockade line from the Shetland Islands to Bergen, 
and free German naval forces and merchant marine from 
the danger of containment in a "land-locked" North Sea. 
Contrarily, a German occupation of Norway would produce 
United States Army (Washington, D. C., 1942). "Utsira" 
(Norway 1:100,000), Army Map Service, United States Army 
(Second edition, Washington, D. C., 1942). "Norway 
(South); Special Strategic Map" (Norway 1:2,000,000), 
Army Map Service, United States Army (First edition, 
Washington, D. C., 1943). "Norway (North): Special 
Strategic Map" (Norway 1:2,000,000), Army Map Service, 
United States Army (Washington, D. C., 1943). Corps of 
Engineers, United States Army, Army Map Service, Map 
Directory Catalog (Washington, D. C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1964), I, AMS M613. 
Sverre Petterssen, W. C. Jacobs, B. C. Haynes, Meteorology 
of the Arctic, in Technical Assistant for Polar Projects, 
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Department, 
The Dynamic North (Washington, D. C., 1955), Book I, 
0p-03A3, 75-79. Harald U. Sverdrup, Oceanography of the 
Arctic, in Technical Assistant for Polar Projects, 
The Dynamic North, Book I, 18-20. Ruge, Der Seekrieg, 
112. 
^Including the perimeters of large islands and the 
major sinuosities of the coast, the shoreline is 
estimated to exceed 12,000 miles in length. See Axel 
C. Z. S;^mme, ed. , A Geography of Norden (Oslo: J. W. 
Cappelens forlag, 1960), 235. Hereafter cited as S^mme, 
Norden. 
6 
a strong British counteraction and necessitate the 
defense of the long Norwegian coastline against superior 
British naval power. The maintenance of strict neutrality 
by Norway, however, would provide the surest protection 
for German shipping threading its way through Norwegian 
territorial waters of the Indreled. An Allied occupation 
of Norway, on the other hand, could not be countenanced 
because it would disrupt German naval warfare, influence 
Sweden and thus endanger the German position in the Baltic 
Sea, and lead to the interdiction of Swedish iron ore 
shipments from the Norwegian port of Narvik. 
The nexus of German interest in Norway, in point 
of fact, was this transshipment of high-grade, low 
phosphoric iron ore from the mines at Kiruna and Gflllivare 
in the Swedish province of Norbotten by rail to the 
ice-free port of Narvik and thence south by ship down the 
"Iron Road" through the Inner Leads to the Skagerrak and 
Germany. As early as 1934 Adolf Hitler acknowledged the 
significance of the ore shipments. In a conversation with 
the Commander in Chief of the German Navy Erich Raeder and 
Reich Marshal Hemann Goering, when the Grand Admiral was 
seeking additional funds for naval construction. Hitler 
said that "he considered it vital that the Navy be 
increased as planned, as no war could be carried on if 
the Navy was not able to safeguard the ore imports from 
7 
7 Scandinavia." 
Total German iron ore imports rose from 8,264,600 
metric tons® in 1934 to 20,620,900 in 1937 and 
21,927,500 in 1938 while the imports during these same 
years from Norwegian and Swedish fields fluctuated from 
529,100 to 509,700, to 1,118,100 metric tons and from 
4,694,700 to 9,083,800 to 8,992,300 metric tons 
9 respectively. Norwegian iron ore was produced princi­
pally at Sydvaranger in Eastern Finnmark and shipped from 
Kirkenes; at scattered points along the northern coast 
including Fosdalen in Nord TrdJndelag, Dunderland, 
7 Office of United States Chief of Counsel for 
Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and 
Aggression (8 vols, and 2 supps., Washington, D. C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1946-1948), 
VI, 1018. Hereafter cited as N ̂  A. 
8 One metric ton is equivalent to 0.98421 long 
ton (Br.), 1.10231 short tons (U. S.), or 2,204.62 av. 
pounds. Charles D. Hodgman, ed., Handbook of Chemistry 
and Physics (Cleveland, 1963), 3332. 
9 League of Nations, Statistical Yearbook of the 
League of Nations (Geneva, 1939), 1938/39, 145-147. 
United States Congress. Senate. Committee on Military 
Affairs, Authorizing ̂  Study of War Mobilization Problems, 
Hearings, 79th Cong., 1st sess., on S. Res. 107 and S. Res. 
46 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1945), 159, 228-230, 418, 436. Hereafter cited 
as Senate, Hearings. United States Tariff Commission, 
Foreign Trade and Exchange Controls in Germany 
(Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1942), 125, 215, 280. 
8 
Elsfjord, and the Bogen-Fagernes-Liland grouping on the 
Ofotfjord, and opposite Tromsfl; and in the southeast in 
the vicinity of Arendal.^*^ Production from these fields 
reached Germany by way of the Leads and the North Sea 
while ore from the main Swedish deposits at Kiruna and 
GSllivare in northern Norbotten was exported through 
Narvik, as previously mentioned, as well as through the 
port of Lulea at the head of the Gulf of Bothnia and then 
south by cargo vessel via the Gulf and the Baltic Sea to 
Germany. Lulea, however, was sealed shut by ice from 
mid-December to mid-May^^ leaving Narvik the sole outlet. 
Ore from the smaller Bergslagen region in south-central 
Sweden (northeast of Lake V^nern) was exported from the 
Bothnian port of GSvle and the ice-free port of Oxelflsund 
12 on the Baltic. 
Ore from the north, however, moved in approximately 
equal quantities via the Baltic and the North Sea accord­
ing to Paul Pleiger, Director General of the Vorstand of 
the Reichswerke Aktiengesellschaft ftir Erzbergbau und 
Eisenhtltten "Hermann Goering", in a memorandum sent to 
^"^Naval Intelligence, Norway, 239-242. 
^^See particularly Figure 4.4, "Average Extension 
of Ice in the Baltic...," in S;z^mme, Norden, 51; and also 
52. 
12 GSvle as not xce-free. Ibid. 
the Reich Ministry of Economics on February 16, 1938, 
seeking an increased capitalization of the "Hermann 
Goering Works." He went on to point out the "helpless 
dependence" of German manufacturers on supplies of 
Swedish iron ore: 
In view of the different political 
constellations in Germany and the Nordic 
states, the Swedish ore shipments are of 
even greater importance. It is quite 
impossible to foresee today whether 
Sweden and Norway...would respect even 
sufficiently long-term delivery con­
tracts , and in the event of war, for 
political reasons, would maintain or 
abruptly stop ore shipments to 
Germany. 
Moreover, Pleiger believed that the routes of ore 
delivery would be difficult to defend; either mines or 
the Russian Navy could close the Baltic to shipping; the 
North Sea route presented innumerable opportunities for 
attack and disruption; railroad routes across Sweden 
would be open to sabotage; and naval bombardment in 
exposed coastal areas would be an added danger, not only 
13 His italics. Nuernberg Military Tribunals, 
Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military 
Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 (15 vols., 
Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1950-1952), XII, 522—"The Ministries Case" 
(Ernst von Weizsaecker, ̂  , Hereafter cited as 
T W C. 
10 
14 to the railroads but also to Norwegian mines. 
Confronted with this iron ore problem, Germany 
consumed over 33,000,000 metric tons of ore in 1938; but 
15 intensive utilization of small, scattered domestic 
deposits yielded only 11,145,000 metric tons of generally 
lean^^ ore—about one-third of her "normal" require-
17 ments. With the outbreak of war in 1939, the Allied 
K C, XII, 522. 
^^The major German iron ore deposits were located 
in the Dill, Lahn, and Sieg valleys, the Ilsede-Peine 
and Salzgitter districts, and east of the Rhine River 
south of the Ruhr. Smaller deposits were also found in 
Bavaria and the Vogelsberg. See Robert E. Dickinson, 
Germany; A General and Regional Geocrraphv (London: 
Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1951), 237-244. 
16 Senate, Hearings, 229. It averaged less than 
forty-five per cent after treatment. 
17 Lorraine ore from France was of the minette 
type, low-grade, averaging slightly over thirty per cent 
iron and requiring concentration or mixing with rich 
ores before smelting. Thus, the 5,100,000 metric tons 
of French iron ore imported by Germany in 1938 actually 
possessed a metallic content roughly equivalent to 
2,550,000 metric tons of Swedish ore which ranged in 
purity from 58 to 72 per cent iron. Rendered in the 
converse, disregarding the detractive factor of the high 
phosphorus content of French ores, at least 17,984,600 
metric tons of French ore would have been required to 
equal the loss of Swedish ore alone. This must have been 
another reason for the stress placed upon the retention 
of the Swedish iron ore supply. C_f. Senate, Hearings, 
229 and United States Tariff Commission, Foreign Trade 
and Exchange Controls in Germany, 215. 
11 
blockade cut Germany off from almost all of her foreign 
supplies of iron ore except those from Scandinavia 
resulting in an estimated yearly loss exceeding 9,500,000 
18 metric tons. Consequently, the security and maintenance, 
if not the expansion, of the Scandinavian iron ore 
deliveries became a strategical imperative for the Third 
Reich. 
18 Derry, Campaign, 10. 
CHAPTER I 
BASES OR NEUTRALITY? 
The arguments advanced by Vice Admiral Wegener 
remained viable in 1939, but his basic premise had been 
altered. Without a battle fleet adequate to challenge 
successfully Britain's control of the sea lanes, the 
protection of German merchant shipping beyond the confines 
of the Baltic Sea and the North Sea was doomed to failure? 
but the conduct of "tonnage war" against British commerce 
was based upon similar requirements. To mount and sustain 
a successful submarine offensive against British shipping 
was impossible, and the OKH was asked if the capture of 
French Atlantic ports could be anticipated. The High 
Command replied that even the acquisition of French 
Channel ports was uncertain. Obviously, a stalemate was 
anticipated in any land offensive against France.^ 
1 Stefan T. Possony, "Decision Without Battle," 
United States Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis, 
Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1946), LXXII, 
762. 
12 
13 
No strategic or operational plan had been prepared 
by Germany before the opening of World War II for the 
occupation of Norway; the initial stimulus came from 
Admiral Rolf Carls, Commanding Admiral, Baltic Sea Station 
and Naval Group East, in late September 1939. A year 
earlier while serving as Vice Admiral and Chief of the 
Fleet, Carls had recorded his "Opinion on the 'Draft Study 
of Naval Warfare against England'" in a top secret memo­
randum and had acknowledged his "full agreement" with its 
central theme. "If, according to the Fuehrer's decision," 
he stated, "Germany is to acquire a position as a world 
power she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions 
but also secure naval communications and secure access to 
the ocean " He did not believe that this could 
be accomplished by peaceful means but would lead to a war 
"against 1/2 to 2/3 of the whole world." Undismayed by 
such an eventuality, Carls asserted and reiterated. 
It can only be justified and have a chance 
of success if it is prepared economically 
as well as politically, and militarily, 
and waged with the aim of conquering for 
Germany an outlet to the ocean. 
E C, X, 519-520—"The High Command Case" 
(Wilhelm von Leeb, ) • His italics. See also N C A, 
VI, 828-829 and International Military Tribunal, Trial of 
the Major War Criminals Before the International Military 
Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945—1_ October 1946 (42 
vols., Nuremberg: Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the 
jurisdiction of the Allied Control Authority for Germany, 
1947-1949), III, 120-121. Hereafter cited as T M W C. 
14 
Grand Admiral Erich Raeder testified at Nuremberg 
that he had not concerned himself with the question of 
Norway until Admiral Carls telephoned him during the 
closing days of September 1939. Carls apprised him of a 
letter which he was sending to him that dealt with the 
danger of a British occupation of Norway. The letter 
discussed in general terms, according to Raeder, the dis­
advantages this would have for Germany, whether they 
should forestall it, and what disadvantages or advantages 
a German occupation of "the Norwegian Coast and the 
3 Norwegian bases...would have." The testimony of Vice 
Admiral Otto Schniewind, Chief of Staff of the 
4 Seekriegsleitung, that Raeder gave him not only the 
letter from Carls but also the assignment to investigate 
5 the questions with which Carls had dealt, corroborated 
Raeder's testimony.^ It was further buttressed by a 
memorandum containing the foregoing facts which Raeder 
had sent on January 10, 1944, to Admiral Kurt Assmann, the 
7 official German Naval Historian, for his personal use. 
\ M W C, XIV, 86. 
"Naval War Staff" or "Naval Operations Staff" are 
used synonymously for translating Seekriegsleitung. 
T M W C, X, 752. Hereafter also referred to as the SKL. 
^T W C, X, 783. 
S M W C, XIV, 86. 
\ C A, VI, 891-892. 
15 
In this memorandum to Assmann, Raeder noted that 
since he was of an identical opinion as Admiral Carls, he 
based some notes for a subsequent report to Hitler on 
Carls' letter. Raeder then described for Assmann the 
disadvantages, as he had viewed them at the time, which 
would arise for Germany following a British occupation of 
Norway—"control of the approaches to the Baltic, flanking 
of our naval operations and of our attacks on Britain, 
g 
pressure on Sweden." He wrote that he had "mentioned" 
in his notes the advantages to be gained by occupying the 
coast of Norway—"outlet to the North Atlantic, no possi­
bility of British minefields." Only bases and the 
9 littoral were under consideration. "I included Narvik, 
Raeder stated, "though Admiral Carls...hoped that Narvik 
might be excluded." He added parenthetically to Assmann, 
"At that time, we were able to use Murmansk and/or a 
special Russian base." No mention was made of the iron 
ore traffic. Apparently, either the Commander in Chief 
®N C A, VI, 891-892. 
9 Schniewind stated at Nuremberg: "A further trend 
of thought...in [cirlF3 letter was that, under certain 
circumstances, we might gain possession of certain bases 
in Norway with Russian help or Russian pressure..." 
T W C, X, 783. 
^°N C A, VI, 892. 
16 
of the German Navy was thinking largely in strictly 
military terms; or the acquisition of the iron ore ports 
and the Leads was so obvious an advantage in face of the 
posited situation (i. _e. , a British takeover) that it 
did not have to be enumerated. Raeder's inclusion of 
Narvik probably belies the former alternative, however, 
although Carls evidently was more concerned with the 
purely military realities and chose to ignore the 
economic. Norwegian and Swedish ore loomed so large in 
Germany's war-making potential that it seems illusory to 
believe that it was totally disregarded.^^ 
On October 3, 193 9, Grand Admiral Raeder, acting 
in his capacity as Chief of the Naval War Staff, notified 
the SKL that he thought the Ftihrer should be told as soon 
as possible about their views concerning "the possibil­
ities of extending the operational base to the North." 
He asked them in a questionnaire to ascertain if combined 
Russian and German pressure could be used to obtain bases 
in Norway "with the aim of improving fundamentally our 
^^Indeed, in the months immediately preceding the 
war, Raeder and his staff had discussed the Scandinavian 
ore question and had decided that it would be best to 
"keep Norway neutral" since the German Navy could not 
hope to defend Norway's long coastline. See Anthony 
Martienssen, Hitler and His Admirals (London: Seeker and 
Warburg, 1948), 43. 
17 
strategic and operational position." In addition, they 
were to determine what sites should be considered as 
bases, whether the bases could be seized by force if that 
were necessary, what their defensive requirements would 
be, and the degree of existing harbor developments. 
Interjecting the comment that the Flag Officer of U-boats, 
Rear Admiral Karl Dflnitz, considered such Norwegian 
harbors "extremely useful as equipment—and supply—bases 
for Atlantic U-boats to call at temporarily," Raeder then 
concluded his questionnaire by asking the Naval War Staff 
to determine "what decisive advantage would exist for the 
conduct of the War at sea in gaining a base in North 
12 Denmark e.g. Skagen" —a question reminiscent of Admiral 
Wegener's concern with the offensive potential inherent 
13 in the full utilization of the Skagerrak and Kattegat. 
In response to Raeder's questions, the Chief of 
Staff of the SKL submitted a wary appraisal. Certain 
profits might accrue to Germany from the seizure of 
Norwegian bases, according to the SKL; but militarily 
considered, they were questionable when equated with the 
danger involved; namely, the cessation of coastal 
C A, VI, 928. 
^^Supra, 2. 
18 
commerce because of British naval superiority once Norway 
had become a theater of war. Consequently, the Naval War 
Staff concluded that a continuation of Norway's neutrality, 
rigidly respected by all parties concerned, would be the 
14 preferred solution. 
In his memorandum to Admiral Assmann, Raeder noted 
his disagreement with the SKL's doubts concerning 
15 
obtaining Norwegian bases. Yet, according to his own 
and the corroborating testimony of Schniewind, Raeder 
evidently subscribed to the War Staff's view favoring the 
continuance of Norway's neutrality: "It was entirely 
clear to me," Raeder testified after the war, "that the 
best possible solution for us would be that Norway should 
maintain a steadfast neutrality 
On October 10, before the close of a general 
situation conference, the Grand Admiral broached the 
17 subject of Norway with Adolf Hitler. Synthesizing his 
W C, X, 783-785. 
C A, VI, 891-892. 
M W C, XIV, 87-88. No direct evidence avail­
able refutes his statement. See also T W C, X, 786-787. 
17 Raeder stated at Nuremberg that reports received 
through the offices of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of 
the OKW's Intelligence Service, of British intentions to 
occupy bases in Norway prompted him to request this con­
ference with Hitler. T M W C, XIV, 85. Similar reports 
were received from Lieutenant Commander Richard Schreiber, 
19 
notes from Admiral Carls' letter and the views of the 
Naval Operations Staff, he presented his foregoing con­
clusion and set forth the dangers involved in Britain 
procuring bases in Norway. Once lodged there, and espe­
cially in southern Norway, the Allies would be able to 
dominate the approaches to the Baltic Sea, outflank naval 
movements from the Elbe and Weser rivers and from the 
Helgoland Bight, imperil the passage to the North Atlantic, 
endanger reconnaissance flights over the North Sea and air 
attacks on England, terminate ore exports from Narvik, and 
exert intensive political pressure on Sweden resulting in 
the obstruction or stopping of ore shipments. The possi­
bility existed that they might even venture "to attack 
and destroy the ore deposits at Lulea si^, or to seize 
4-T, ..18 them. 
Naval Attache in Oslo. Ibid., 308. See also T W C, X, 
784. 
Until this time, Adolf Hitler saw no threat from 
the Allies. In his "Memorandum and Directives for Conduct 
of the War in the West," issued from Berlin on October 9, 
1939, he declared: "Provided no completely unforeseen 
factors appear, their |the Nordic states'j neutrality 
is...to be assumed. The continuation of German trade 
with these countries appears possible even in a war of 
long duration." N ̂  A, VII, 803. 
1 ft 
T M W C, XIV, 88. 
20 
These perils might in themselves become deciding 
factors in the outcome of the war, the Grand Admiral 
believed; but he directed Hitler's attention to corre­
sponding dangers in a German seizure of Norwegian terri­
tory. British naval action during and after any German 
occupation would attempt to hamper the ore traffic while 
a struggle might continue which the Third Reich, with its 
"inadequate supply of surface vessels," could not deal 
with in the long run. Therefore, he did not propose 
19 acquisition of bases or an occupation of Norway. 
In his 1944 memorandum to the Naval Historian 
Assmann, however, Raeder did state that he had "mentioned" 
in his notes on Carls' letter the advantages of occupying 
the Norwegian coast. Since these notes were used as a 
partial basis for his presentation to Hitler, it would 
be reasonable to assume that Raeder told Hitler about 
them. This was not admitted by Raeder at Nuremberg, nor 
in the supporting testimony of Vice Admiral Otto 
Schniewind; and the question of Narvik was likewise 
passed over without any interrogation. In addition, for 
the first time, the dangers inherent in the iron ore 
dilemma were clearly presented to Hitler by the Commander 
^^T M W C, XIV, 88-89. T W C, X, 786-787, 
21 
20 in Chxef of the Navy. 
Admiral Raeder's original questions concerning 
Norwegian bases had also been submitted to Rear Admiral 
Karl Dflnitz; but his reply was not received by Raeder 
until shortly after his conference with the Ftlhrer on 
20 Two rather contradictory statements were made by 
Raeder with reference to Hitler's response at the 
October 10 conference: first, in 1944, "The Fuehrer saw 
at once the significance of the Norwegian problem; he 
asked me to leave the notes and stated that he wished to 
consider the question himself," (N ̂  A, VI, 892.); and 
last, at Nuremberg, "The question was very far from his 
mind, for he knew very little about matters of naval 
warfare. ...He said that he would deal with this question 
and that I should leave the notes with him...so that he 
might use them as a basis for his deliberations on this 
problem," (T M W C, XIV, 90.). 
The latter statement was ironical in view of the 
fact that Hitler, in his "Memorandum and Directives for 
Conduct of the War in the West," issued the previous day 
(October 9), declared: 
The U-boat, can, even today, if ruthlessly 
employed, be an extraordinary threat to 
England, The weakness of German U-boat 
warfare lies in the great distances to the 
scenes of action, in the extraordinary 
danger attached to these journeys and in 
the continuous threat to their home bases. 
That England has not, for the moment, laid 
the great minefield, as in the World War, 
between Norway and the Shetland Isles is 
possibly connected—provided the will to 
wage war exists at all—with a shortage of 
necessary barrage materials. But, if the 
war lasts long, an increasing difficulty 
to our U-boats must be reckoned with in 
the use of these only remaining inward and 
outward routes. The creation of U-boat 
strongpoints outside these constricted 
home bases would lead to an enormous 
increase in the striking power of this 
arm, N C_ A, VII, 806, 
Where else could these be envisaged but in France and/or 
Norway? 
22 
21 
October 10, 1939, Decidedly in favor of a military 
takeover of bases in Norway, Dflnitz incisively catalogued 
the points at issue and advised the establishment of 
bases at Narvik and Trondheim: a "position outside the 
Shetlands-Norway Straits," "freedom from ice," and "rail 
communications" were the three considerations for any 
Norwegian base; and only these two possessed them. Common 
advantages also possessed by both ports were various 
approach channels which were deep and difficult to mine, 
locations along the fjords which could not be shelled from 
the ocean, and "protected areas directly in front of the 
harbor for exercises and entry." Additional advantages 
possessed by Trondheim were its southern location offer­
ing close contact with Germany; more favorable climatic 
conditions, and shorter distance to the Atlantic sea lanes 
(The reverse of these were among Narvik's disadvantages as 
set forth by Dfinitz.); "basins... suitable for U-boats"; 
and industrial establishments and shipyards capable of 
constructing the required facilities for a base. 
Trondheim's only drawback was the short distance to 
British air bases, but the greater distance to Narvik was 
in its favor. On the other hand, Narvik had little indus­
trial development, no basins, and rail connections only 
M W C, XIV, 86. 
23 
with the Gulf of Bothnia. Thus, Dflnitz decided that 
Trondheim was the more favorable site for a base; and 
he proposed that it be established as a supply and repair 
point with the necessary defensive protection and accom­
modations for submarine crews, Narvik should be made a 
22 refuelxng center, DdJnitz concluded. 
This assessment makes manifest the military value 
of Trondheim and Narvik as naval bases for the German 
Navy; but equally obvious is DdJnitz' s failure to evaluate 
Raeder's question, "Can bases be gained by military force 
23 against Norway's wxll...?" Dflnitz's interest in expan­
sion northward along the Norwegian littoral apparently 
overlooked or chose to dispense with so vital a problem 
taking for granted that Germany would be successful. 
Moreover, the purely naval question advanced by Raeder of 
what advantages might be gained by Germany in taking a 
base in northern Denmark likewise failed to be examined. 
While political rationalizations for the proposed 
acquisitions in Norway were not within the purview of his 
reply to Raeder, it is significant that not even the naval 
rationale for such a move was assayed by Rear Admiral 
Dfinitz; and he also did not respond to the enjoiner to 
C A, VI, 815-816.. 
^^Ibid.. 928. 
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consider the possibility of acquiring bases through joint 
Russo-German pressure on Norway. 
No evidence can be found indicating that any 
specifics like those detailed by Dfinitz were touched upon 
in the conference between Hitler and Raeder on October 10. 
It would be interesting to know what, if any, influence 
Dflnitz's views would have had on Hitler's concern with 
Norway. The naval transcript of the conference closes 
with only the brief notation; 
The Commander in Chief, Navy points out 
how important it would be for submarine 
warfare to obtain bases on the Norwegian 
coast, e. g., Trondheim, with the help 
of Russian pressure. „The Fuehrer will 
consider this matter. 
The above excerpt reveals Grand Admiral Raeder's 
interest in acquiring bases by peaceful means while, at 
the same time, he sought to encourage the extension of 
mutual military and political engagements with the Soviet 
Union. An entry in a file kept by the OKM shows that on 
September 23, 1939, the head of the German Navy "for the 
first time" raised the question with Hitler of Soviet 
co-operation in ceding submarines to Germany, equipping 
24 Office of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy 
Department, Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing With 
the German Navy (Washington, D. C.: United States Navy 
Department, 1946-1947; 9 vols, chronologically from 1939 
through 1945, 1940 and 1941 being subdivided with two 
vols, each), 1939, 14. Hereafter cited as Fuehrer 
Conferences. See also N £ A, Supp. A, 1015. 
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auxiliary cruisers at Murmansk, and permitting German 
25 warships to call at Russian ports. 
The Ftihrer stressed caution in any negotiations 
with the Russians; nevertheless, certain naval privileges 
were procured. On October 10, Admiral Raeder reported to 
Hitler the outfitting of auxiliary cruisers in the Soviet 
Union, including one at Murmansk, and that the offer of a 
base on the bay east of Murmansk was going to be investi­
gated. Beyond this. Hitler would countenance no further 
involvement with the Soviet Union in naval negotiations. 
During the same conference. Hitler rejected, "for polit­
ical reasons, the proposal to construct submarines in 
2 6 Russia, or to buy them from her." This intransigence 
lay athwart Raeder's desire to secure combined 
Russian-German pressure to overawe Norway. Six days 
later, however, the Commander in Chief of the German 
Navy was able to report to the Ftihrer that the Russians 
had placed at their disposal a "well-situated base west 
27 of Murmansk." The next day (October 17) preparations 
28 
were in progress for this "Base North." 
25 N C A, VI, 978. See also Fuehrer Conferences, 
1939, 10. 
2 6^., . , , T Ibid., 13. 
^"^Ibid. , 21. N C A, VIII, 545. 
^®lMd. , VI, 976. 
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Although a detailed memorandum had been drafted on 
October 15 expressing the OKM's desire to intensify naval 
29 warfare culminating in a "siege from the sea" against 
Great Britain, it failed to mention Norwegian bases. In 
reporting to Adolf Hitler on October 23, 1939, Admiral 
Raeder read another, brief memorandum which incorporated 
the salient points of economic warfare and called for 
driving home to neutral nations that 
they can never emerge from this war as 
laughing victors in the face of an 
economically destroyed or weakened 
Germany. This is a war of the entire 
European economic area, and in this war 
the fate of all the neutral states of 
Europe, especially the Scandinavian and 
Baltic states is inextricably linked to 
the fate of Germany... 
Hitler agreed and held that "pressure on the northern 
31 countries is easiest to exert." 
By November 1, Raeder was able to record that 
German submarine warfare had been intensified "as much as 
possible" and only the proclamation of a "state of siege 
29 _I. ^. / "completely ruthless prosecution of... 
economic war." N C A, VIII, 558. Although given to the 
Ftihrer during the October 15 naval conference, the memo­
randum was not officially distributed until November 3, 
1939. Fuehrer Conferences, 1939, 21. N ̂  A, VIII, 546. 
^'^Fuehrer Conferences, 1939, 27. 
^^Ibid., 22. 
27 
against England" was lacking which would permit the 
torpedoing of neutral ships without warning after their 
home governments had been notified concerning this 
32 declaration. In reply to a question raised during his 
conference with Hitler and General Wilhelm Keitel on 
November 10 whether the declaration should be made in 
conjunction with the opening of a land offensive in the 
West in order to divert hostile attention, Raeder sug­
gested that it be delayed while other means of intensi­
fication were undertaken by the Navy: first, the sinking 
without warning of enemy passenger vessels; and similar 
action later against neutral vessels carrying contraband 
which would create essentially the same conditions as 
proclaiming a "state of siege." Hitler agreed but added 
the proviso that such sinkings only follow the announce­
ment of the names of the ships involved and the statement 
that they were being utilized as troop transports and 
auxiliary cruisers. The proclamation and action against 
neutral vessels would be considered when a change in 
33 neutral attitude occurred. The episode which had just 
32 Fuehrer Conferences, 1939, 33. 
^^Ibid., 35-37. 
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34 concluded concerning the City of Flint undoubtedly 
influenced the Ftlhrer' s decision and drew attention to 
the "security" of Norden and of Norway in particular. 
During the conference. Hitler queried Raeder about 
naval requirements for bases along the Belgian-Dutch coast 
34 The U. S. s.s. City of Flint, partly laden with 
contraband, was intercepted by the German pocket battle­
ship Deutschland (later renamed the Ltltzow) on October 9 
in the North Atlantic; and a prize crew was placed on 
board. Twelve days later, she put in at the Norwegian 
port of Tromsfl ostensibly to replenish her water supply 
and then proceeded to the Russian port of Murmansk which 
she entered on October 23 only to be detained and to have 
her prize crew interned by the Soviets. Despite demands 
by the United States for her restoration to American 
sovereignty, the Soviet Union released the German prize 
crew and ordered the City of Flint to leave Murmansk on 
October 26. Departing the next day, the City of Flint 
returned to Tromsdi where she was granted permission to 
use Norwegian territorial waters en route to Germany. 
Reaching Haugesund, she put into port without just cause 
or permission, was immediately seized by Norwegian naval 
authorities, and turned over to her American crew on 
November 4 in spite of German protests. The German 
Government was left to speculate whether or not British 
and French influence had contributed to the outcome; but 
it seems to have been an independent Norwegian response 
to an obvious, although debated, violation of her 
neutrality. In his November 10 naval conference. Hitler 
agreed with Admiral Raeder that the case of the City of 
Flint had been "mismanaged" and the ship should be 
permitted to return home unmolested. Fuehrer Conferences, 
1939, 36. Winston S, Churchill, The Gathering Storm 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), 431 and 461. 
Hereafter cited as Churchill, Gathering Storm. Anthony 
Martienssen, Hitler and His Admirals. 44. Max Beloff, 
The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-1941 (2 vols., 
London: Oxford University Press, 1963), II, 295. 
Hereafter cited as Beloff, Foreign Policy. 
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only to be informed that they would be too close to the 
English coast and therefore unsuitable as submarine bases. 
Not included in the reports of Fuehrer Conferences on 
Matters Dealing With the German Navy for 1939, the entry 
in a file on Russo-German affairs from the archives of 
the German Naval High Command for the November 10 confer­
ence noted: 
Fuehrer rejects purchase of Russian sub­
marines again, since he is convinced, 
that the Russian ships are in bad 
condition, and that the Russians 'should 
not see any weakness with us. 
Twice rebuffed concerning submarine purchases, Raeder 
apparently also discarded his hope of securing forward 
bases in Norway with Russian diplomatic support; and when 
the question of Norwegian bases was again raised 
(December 8, 1939), no mention was made of Russian 
. , 36 assistance. 
The OKM's attention in the meantime shifted to the 
Baltic Sea where the desired control over neutral shipping 
and the interdiction of British commerce had met with less 
success than had been anticipated. Another cause of 
concern was the continuing transshipment of goods (chiefly 
pit props for British collieries and lumber) by rail 
^^N ̂  A, VI, 980. Fuehrer Conferences, 1939, 36. 
^^Ibid., 46. 
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across Sweden and Norway from Finland and the Baltic 
States which the German Navy considered essential and 
should be kept from reaching the Allies. Maritime traffic 
between Allied ports and Trondheim, western terminus of 
the trans-Scandinavian rail route, as well as normal 
trade between Scandinavia and Great Britain, however, was 
difficult to prevent since merchant vessels could easily 
depart from Norwegian territorial waters through the 
Skiaerqard at numerous points along the coast. Moreover, 
Sweden's firm insistence that belligerent powers respect 
her neutral rights, especially with regard to her terri­
torial waters, gave protection to shipping in the Baltic 
37 and led to a series of disputes wxth Germany. 
Swedish naval units had made attacks "on German 
naval forces engaged in the war against merchant shipping 
in the Sound and the Aland Sea," the Commander in Chief 
of the German Navy reported to the Reich Chancellor on 
November 22, 1939. Hitler was in favor of reciprocating 
38 
with "drastic measures," but no direct action was taken. 
In fact, three days later during a naval situation confer­
ence, the head of the OKM explained: "Northern states 
37 Fuehrer Conferences, 1939, 35-46, 
^^Ibid., 39-41. 
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39 under the pressure of Germanv/Russia neutral." A sketch 
found in the Fuehrer Conferences, dated November 25, 
states: 
The socialistic parliamentary governments 
in these |Scandinavian] countries are in 
themselves enemies of National Socialism. 
If Germany's situation deteriorates, 
their attitude may be expected to alter. 
Herein lay an additional danger for the Scandinavian ore 
shipments. Consequently, the conclusion was reached that 
without military commitments in the East, 
for the first time in fifty years a war 
on one front is possible. If Germany 
takes a defensive attitude, her situation 
will gradually deteriorate not only from 
the military point of view but also in 
foreign policy. Victory can be achieved 
by offensive action alone. 
Offensive action followed, but it was not taken by 
Germany. On November 30, 1939, the Soviet Union invaded 
Finland, introducing a complicating strain into 
Russo-German relations as well as arousing German fears 
that Allied assistance to the Finns (which would have had 
to pass through Norway and Sweden) would be the convenient 
pretext for seizing Narvik, Lule§, and even the Kiruna-
41 GSllivare ore fields. This, of course, would 
C A, VI, 980. 
40 
Fuehrer Conferences, 1939, 43-44. 
41 Their concern was well-founded. See Churchill, 
Gathering Storm, 533-589 and especially 542-548. Beloff, 
Foreign Policy, 304-308. 
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simultaneously cut the iron ore traffic to Germany and 
strategically outflank her on the north. 
CHAPTER II 
A CAUTIOUS APPROACH 
The Russo-Finnish War greatly magnified the 
strategic importance of the Scandinavian Peninsula while 
Germany's adherence to strict neutrality, both out of 
self-interest and because of her commitment in the Nazi-
Soviet Pact, contributed to the rise of anti-German 
feeling in Norway and Sweden. Their fear of Germany was 
matched by fear of a Russian invasion of northern 
Scandinavia which aroused anxiety concerning consequential 
British countermeasures. Despite their peoples' sympathy 
for the Finnish cause, the Norwegian and Swedish govern­
ments held to neutrality as the only recourse in their 
attempt to avoid involvement in the wars which surrounded 
them while at the same time attempting to provide what 
assistance they could without provoking the ire of either 
Germany or Russia.^ 
^Beloff, Foreign Policy, 304-309. United States 
Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 
1918-1945, Series D (1937-1945) (13 vols., Washington, 
D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1950-
1964), VIII, 539-541. Hereafter cited as D G F P. 
Churchill, Gathering Storm, 542-543. 
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Lieutenant Commander Richard Schreiber, Naval 
Attache in Oslo, kept Grand Admiral Raeder informed of 
these developments, including rumors that the Allies were 
planning landings in Norway. Raeder told Hitler on 
December 8, 1939, "Transport via Sweden and Norway over 
Trondheim to England is extremely active;" and he avowed, 
2 "It IS important to occupy Norway." For Germans at the 
time, Erich Raeder later wrote in his memoirs, "the con­
clusion was inescapable that the dispatch of 
troops through these two neutral countries would end in 
some of them being left there, and air bases being set up, 
3 and a whole new front built up there against Germany." 
By January 1940, the rising current of pro-Finnish senti­
ment, especially in France, enhanced the probability that 
more positive steps than previously would be taken by the 
c A, VI, 892. T W C, X, 786. Fuehrer 
Conferences, 1939, 46. In his "Discussion Points" 
prepared for this conference, Raeder declared: "Sweden's 
attitude is very unsatisfactory. The German barrage in 
the Sound has been extended as far as the three mile limit 
against the will of Sweden. There is still heavy traffic 
in Falsterbo Channel.... In spite of Swedish assurances 
to the contrary, the Swedish mine field laid in the 
Quarken and Aland Sea must be regarded as a purely anti-
German measure directed at complicating Germany's war 
against merchant shipping. A protest has been made to 
the Swedish Government." Ibid., 51. 
3 Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, ̂  Life (Trans. Henry 
W. Drexel, Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval 
Institute, 1960), 304. Hereafter cited as Raeder, My Life. 
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Allies to aid Finland; and newspapers were even printing 
rumors of the impending departure of Allied aid for 
4 Finland. 
Meanwhile, Raeder found support for his proposals 
regarding Norway from an unexpected source—Vidkun Quisling. 
The Grand Admiral did not know the former Norwegian 
Minister of War and leader of the small, pro-Nazi National 
Union Party in Norway; but at the request of Reichsleiter 
Alfred Rosenberg, head of the Foreign Affairs Office of 
the NSDAP, he granted an interview to Quisling and 
Wiljam Hagelin, a Norwegian businessman who was Quisling's 
chief representative in Germany, on December 11, 1939. 
Quisling confirmed reports of increasing anti-German 
feeling in Norway, fear of Russian pressure, the Norwegian 
Government's pro-British bias, and rumors of a 
fast-approaching British occupation of Norway which had 
been received from Schreiber and Admiral Canaris. 
According to Quisling, the Norwegian Government and its 
foreign policy were "controlled by the well-known Jew 
5 Hambro" who, with the assistance of British agents, was 
4 Raeder, My Life, 304-305. Beloff, Foreign Policy, 
II, 307-309. 
5 Carl Joachim Hambro, President of the Norwegian 
Storting, 1926-1940, and President of the Assembly of the 
League of Nations, 1939-1940. D G F P, VIII, 965. 
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attempting to "bring Norway under British influence or into 
complete dependence."^ He alleged, moreover, that the 
Norwegian Government had signed a secret treaty with 
Great Britain which gave their consent to a British 
invasion if Norway became involved in a war with another 
great power and that a landing was planned near Stavanger 
with Kristiansand as the possible center for British 
forces in Norway. Quisling and Hagelin then outlined 
their alternative plan which amounted to nothing less than 
a bloodless coup to forestall a British takeover and to 
deliver Norwegian bases into the hands of German troops. 
"Months of negotiations" with Rosenberg had been unpro­
ductive due to the "incompetency of accredited diplomats," 
they said; and they had come in order to establish 
"clear-cut relations with Germany for the future." 
Therefore, they wanted to arrange conferences to discuss 
"combined action, transfer of troops to Oslo, etc., and 
the possible laying of protective minefields." Raeder 
7 agreed to bring the matter to Hitler's attention. 
Summarizing Quisling's rambling interview the 
following day for the Ftihrer, the Grand Admiral said that 
^Fuehrer Conferences, 1939, 56. ^ M W C^, XIV, 
309-310. 
7 Fuehrer Conferences, 1939, 56-57. 
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he had "made a reliable impression"; but Raeder warned 
Hitler that caution was advisable in dealing with 
Quisling since it was "impossible to know with such offers 
how much the people concerned wish to further their own 
party schemes and how important German interests are to 
them." He re-emphasized that Norway had to be denied to 
the British or its occupation by them would prove decisive 
in the war. Again Hitler agreed that a British occupation 
was "unacceptable." Raeder then added another warning: 
German occupation of Norwegian coastal 
bases would naturally occasion strong 
British countermeasures for the purpose 
of interrupting the transport of ore 
from Narvik. ...the German Navy [was] 
not yet prepared to cope with this for 
any length of time.® 
But he added a minimizing footnote to his warning: "In 
9 
the event of occupation this is a weak spot." 
Hitler evidently was interested because he wanted 
to question Rosenberg about Quisling before speaking with 
the latter in person. Raeder was quick to take advantage 
Hitler's interest in Quisling; and having fulfilled his 
responsibility to warn his Supreme Commander of the 
^Fuehrer Conferences, 1939, 54. D G jF P, VIII, 
519-520. N C A, VI, 884-885. 
9 Fuehrer Conferences, 1939, 54. My italics. 
38 
dangers involved in any Norwegian undertaking, he proposed 
that 
If the Fuehrer is favorably impressed, 
the Armed Forces High Command be 
permitted to make plans with Q. slingi 
for preparing and executing the occupation 
either: 
a. by friendly methods, i, e., the 
German Armed Forces are called upon by 
Norway, or 
b. by force. 
{:; The Ftihrer did not discuss this proposal; but on 
December 14, 1939, he conferred with Quisling, Hagelin, 
and Raeder.Quisling certainly must have impressed 
Fuehrer Conferences, 1939, 54-55. D G F^ VIII, 
520. N ̂  A, VI, 884-885. This quotation is followed by 
the notation "(Fuehrer agrees) link notel " in N ̂  A, VI, 
885. "Marginal note in handwriting at (b) : 'The Ftihrer 
agrees. is a footnote found in D G F. VIII, 520. 
This was not included in the Fuehrer Conferences and 
clearly was appended later to the official record. 
^^A note added to the SKL's War Diary contains the 
statement: "12 December 1939. Reception of Q. |Quisling! 
and H. |HageiTn] by the Fuehrer." T W X, 752.^ See 
also N ̂  A, VII, 1106. The editors of the N ̂  A, however, 
clearly indicate in VIII, 519-520, that Hitler and 
Quisling met twice and both times after December 13, the 
date given in General Alfred Jodl's diary for the first 
meeting. The second date which they give is December 18, 
and the first presumably was on December 14. Raeder's 
memorandum to the Naval Historian Assmann on January 10, 
1944, definitely states that the meeting referred to in 
the text above was held on December 14. This is 
supported by Derry, Campaign, 17. On the other hand, 
Rosenberg stated categorically that Hitler and Quisling 
conferred on the 16th and 18th. N C A, III, 22. See 
also ibid., 33, and Raeder, My. Life, 305. Thus, there 
probably were three meetings between December 14 and 18. 
Raeder incidentally confirmed this conclusion in testimony 
at Nuremberg. See M W C, XIV, 95. 
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Hitler because later the same afternoon the Ftlhrer 
ordered preparations to be made by the OKW for a 
12 
Norwegian action. According to General Alfred Jodl, 
Chief of the OKWs Operations Staff, however, these 
"'investigations on how to seize N[orway['" were ordered 
by Hitler to be "'conducted by a very restricted staff 
13 group.'" The "strictest secrecy" was to be observed 
14 by them. "Until that moment," Raeder later recalled, 
the Naval War Staff had taken no part in 
the development of the Norwegian 
question, and, even then, they were 
somewhat skeptical about it. The prepa­
rations, which were undertaken by 
Kpt.z.S. Krancke in the Supreme 
Command of the Armed Forces, were 
founded, however^ on a memorandum of the 
Naval War Staff. 
Hitler conferred again privately with Hagelin and 
Quisling on December 16 and 18 with regard to Norway. 
The account submitted to the Deputy of the Ftlhrer on 
^^N C A, VI, 892. T M W C, XIV, 95. 
13 General Alfred Jodl's Diary, entry for 
December 13 j^i^ , 1939, quoted in D G F. P., VIII, 520, 
footnote 2. ^ee Walther Hubatsch, Die deutsche Besetzung 
von DSnemark und Norwegen 1940 (Gflttingen: "Muster-
schmidt" Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1952), 380. Here­
after cited as Hubatsch, Die deutsche Besetzung. 
14 N C A, III, 34. 
15 KapitSn zur See—Captaxn. 
^^N C A, VI, 892. 
40 
17 
June 17, 1940, entitled "The Political Preparation of 
the Norway Action," contains the only existing record of 
these interviews; and though prepared by the NSDAP's 
Foreign Affairs Office for the purpose of magnifying the 
role of its head, Reichsleiter Rosenberg, it conforms 
substantively with Hitler's hesitation to undertake other 
commitments in the face of repeated postponements in the 
18 execution of Fall Gelb, not to speak of the immediate 
19 crisis over the fate of the Graf Spee. It relates that 
Hilter "emphasized repeatedly that the most preferable 
attitude of Norway as well as all of Scandinavia would be 
20 one of complete neutrality." It was not his intention 
^^June 15, 1940, in D G F P, VIII, 520, footnote 2. 
Cf. with prefatory note to "The Political Preparation of 
the Norway Action," N £ A, III, 19. 
18 "Case Yellow"—code name for the invasion of 
France and the Low Countries which was implemented on 
May 10, 1940. 
19 Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, 
1939-45 (Trans, by R. H. Barry, London; Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1964), 66. Hereafter cited as Warlimont, 
Headquarters. N ̂  A, VI, 893-900. Fuehrer Conferences, 
1939, 60-61. D G F P, VIII, 541-545 and 547-548. The 
Graf Spee was a German pocket battleship acting as a 
commerce raider in the South Atlantic. Encountered, 
disabled, and driven to refuge at Montevideo on 
December 13 by British naval forces, the Graf Spee was 
scuttled in the estuary of the La Plata to avoid intern­
ment on December 17. See Fuehrer Conferences and D G F P 
above, and Churchill, Gathering Storm, 461-470. 
^°N C A, III, 22. 
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to involve other states by expanding the war, the account 
continued; but if the enemy made preparations to enlarge 
the war in order "to further throttle and threaten the 
Greater German Reich then...he would be obliged to arm 
21 agaxnst such steps." 
This vague commitment offered Quisling little 
comfort; but to gain a hold on Quisling, Hitler then 
promised to support financially his "pan-germanic" party 
and efforts to combat increased Allied propaganda. 
Subsidies were to be handled by the Foreign Office while 
liaison with Quisling was to be maintained by an agent 
from Rosenberg's office, Hans-Wilhelm Scheldt, who was 
subordinated to the Naval Attache in Oslo. Political 
oversight was vested in Reichsleiter Rosenberg. All 
military matters were entrusted to a special staff in the 
22 OKW. 
Hitler clearly was not going to be stampeded into 
any abrupt action against Norway; and in spite of his 
sudden interest, he temporized. The German Minister in 
Norway Curt BrSuer, in the meantime, had reported from 
21 N C A, III, 22. Louis de Jong, The German Fifth 
Column in the Second World War (Trans. C. M. Geyl, Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1956), 170. Hereafter 
cited as Louis de Jong, German Fifth Column. 
C A, III, 22 and 33-34. 
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Oslo: "The Norwegian Government is surely determined to 
remain neutral." The people's attitude toward Germany 
was deteriorating, however; and the conviction that 
Russia would seek aggrandizement in northern Norway once 
she had realized her Finnish ambitions was growing in 
proportion to the intensification of the Russo-Finnish 
War. The government had to respond in some degree to its 
citizens' wishes, he wrote; therefore, it permitted 
privately equipped volunteers, other than commissioned 
officers, to go to Finland's assistance although 
recruiting per se was forbidden. To anticipate the 
creation of a political separatist movement in northern 
Norway, Communist sympathizers among army personnel in 
the region had been replaced; and it was widely held, 
BrSuer pointed out, that Britain would not remain idle if 
confronted by a Russian move but would attempt to fore­
stall them "by occupying, for instance, the port of 
Troms)?^. " Yet, Great Britain probably would not be con­
cerned if this did occur "for it would bring her nearer 
to the consummation of a wish expressed even a year 
before the war; namely, to make of Norway, 'one big 
Gibraltar'..." In addition, he said that the military 
authorities were of the opinion that nothing should be 
done to hinder foreign nationals arriving as civilians 
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from assembling in Norway for service in Finland as 
volunteers. This, BrSuer emphasized in closing, should 
23 be accorded "particular attention" by Germany. 
Reasons were not lacking, therefore, for pessimism 
in Germany concerning the course of future developments 
in Norway. Nevertheless, Hitler remained unwilling to 
commit the Third Reich to any offensive action and thereby 
jeopardize the iron ore shipments from Scandinavia. 
D G F P, VIII, 539-541. N C A, III, 22 and 
33-34. Fuehrer Conferences, 1939, 54-55. Raeder had, 
in fact, told Quisling during their conversation on 
December 11 that it would be impossible to undertake 
"any measures from 11 December until 10 January, first 
because the time was too short and secondly because it 
was winter." T M W C, XIV, 93. 
CHAPTER III 
INITIAL PLANNING AND THE 
NORWEGIAN QUESTION 
Instructions to the OKW on December 14, 1939, from 
Adolf Hitler had ordered a small staff group to start 
1 planning for a Norwegian action. Since the problems 
involved in any campaign in Scandinavia would necessitate 
the employment of strong components from each of the 
three services, the responsibility for planning was 
logically assigned to the OKW and its Operations Staff; 
but remembering earlier command difficulties experienced 
by the OKW's Operations Staff with its limited size and 
possibly prompted by the conviction that the Luftwaffe 
would have the heaviest burden in any Norwegian operation. 
General Jodl transmitted Hitler's orders "against all 
established practice" directly to Captain Freiherr Speck 
von Sternberg, Senior Air Officer in the National Defense 
^Supra, 38-39. 
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Section of the OKW's Operations Staff, thereby bypassing 
Colonel Walter Warlimont, the head of Section L, who was 
2 von Sternberg's immediate superior. 
The same day that planning was ordered, the Chief 
of the Army General Staff, Colonel General Franz Haider 
noted in his diary that a combined naval-army action 
3 against Norway was also to include Denmark. Raeder 
testified at Nuremberg that he had let the question of 
Denmark remain open in his reports to Hitler 
supposing that after the occupation of 
the Norwegian coast the English influ­
ence in Denmark could be completely 
eliminated in such wise that the intel­
ligence service there could not cause 
any more harm and the Danish Government 
would comply with the demands of the 
German High Command without function 
friction?!. 
"However," Raeder related, "the Fuehrer decided to occupy 
4 Denmark at the same time." A rationale from the point 
of view of the Commander in Chief of the German Navy for 
not including Denmark in any northern operation is here 
clearly revealed; but while his above statements cannot 
be verified from available sources, whether the blame 
^Warlimont, Headquarters, 59-70. N C A, IV, 104. 
D G F P, VIII, 520. 
3 Generaloberst Franz Haider, Krieqstaqebuch, ed. by 
Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (3 vols., Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer 
Verlag, 1952), I, 142. Hereafter cited as Haider, Diary. 
\ C A, IV, 105. 
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which he placed on Hitler for the inclusion of Denmark is 
veracious or not is less important than the clear indica­
tion which is given that Denmark figured in the planning 
for a Norwegian undertaking from its inception. 
On December 18, 1939, Jodl discussed the Norwegian 
question with General Hans Jeschonnek, Chief of Staff of 
the Luftwaffe, and asked how it should "be handled 
further";^ but Hitler told him the next day that "Case 
Norway" was not to be permitted to leave the hands of the 
OKW. This ended the possibility of Luftwaffe control, 
and Jodl became directly involved himself on the twentieth 
0 with the question of military reconnaissance in Norway. 
No mention was made of Quisling; and preliminary plans 
drafted by Section L of the OKW's Operations Staff, 
entitled Studie Nord, were completed by the end of 
December without his assistance. At Raeder's request, 
the Naval High Command undertook a similar study; but it 
7 was treated as a mere routine exercxse. 
"It is essential that Norway does not fall into 
British hands," Raeder reiterated to Hitler and General 
Keitel on December 30; and he expressed his fear of an 
5 Hubatsch, Die deutsche Besetzung, 380—Jodl's 
Diary, December 18, 1939. 
^Ibid. 
^Warlimont, Headquarters, 70. T W X, 789-790. 
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"unobtrusive occupation of Norway" by "volunteers from 
Britain, in disguise." Consequently, he asserted that 
Germany had to be prepared to take immediate action if 
such an exigency occurred.^ 
Norway's strategic position and importance to the 
German war economy alone demanded vigilance; but the 
Grand Admiral's fear of a military coup by British 
soldiers traveling through Norway as volunteers for the 
Russo-Finnish War and his belief that "serious resistance 
in Norway, and probably also in Sweden, is not to be 
expected" together are incredible, especially in view of 
Ambassador BrSuer's report from Oslo to the German Foreign 
Ministry on January 3, 1940: "I vouch for the Norwegian 
Government's determination today to remain neutral. I 
believe I can vouch for my ability to give prompt notice 
if this attitude should undergo any change." He was 
careful to point out, however, that its determination 
"could be undermined through assistance given in the 
Russo-Finnish conflict, but it cannot be seriously 
impaired by any British proposal to Norway that England 
be granted bases on the Norwegian coast." This would be 
resisted by the people and their government, he insisted; 
and he did not concur with the calamitous outcome which 
Q 
Fuehrer Conferences, 1939, 62. 
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Raeder envisaged if volunteers were to proceed to Finland 
via Norway. "It wants to remain master in its own house," 
he said, "and considers strict neutrality as Norway's only 
effective armament." BrSuer added, almost as an after­
thought, the warning: "The situation would naturally 
change if Russia were to undertake measures against Norway 
9 or Sweden." 
BrSuer's report is buttressed by another from 
Prince Viktor zu Wied, German Minister in Sweden, on 
January 9 wherein he apprised the German Foreign Ministry 
that the Swedish Foreign Minister Christian Gtlnther had 
officially informed him: 
Sweden was prepared energetically, and, 
if necessary, by force of arms to repel 
any attempts of the Western Powers to 
establish bases in Sweden or to trans­
port British or Fr^gch troops through 
Swedish territory. 
This prohibition was also extended to all shipments of 
Allied war materiel to Finland although not to Finnish-
owned supplies; but Gtinther had stated that "practically 
no war material for Finland had been shipped in transit 
so far."^^ Thus, Raeder's fears regarding Norway's 
"demise" appear quite illusory in the light of reports 
from knowledgeable German observers in Scandinavia. What 
is perhaps more telling is the fact that Hitler did not 
G F P, VIII, 603-604. 
^°Ibid., 633-634. 
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respond during their December 30 conference to his Grand 
12 Admiral's representation over Norway. 
General Haider, in fact, concurred with BrSuer's 
evaluation and in a conversation with Keitel on New Year's 
Day held that Norway and Sweden were "strictly neutral." 
Maintenance of Norwegian neutrality was in Germany's 
interest; but if England were to threaten that neutrality, 
they likewise agreed that their policy toward Norway would 
have to change. Quisling was dismissed by the Chief of 
the Army General Staff as an individual whom Rosenberg 
13 had procured and who "had no one behind him." 
Section L had submitted Studie Nord to Hitler 
before the turn of the year, and he had it temporarily 
frozen in the OKW by forbidding its distribution to the 
High Commands of the services. At the beginning of 1940, 
another "exhaustive" examination of the entire Norwegian 
question was made by "responsible experts" in the OKM at 
the request of the Commander in Chief. According to 
Vice Admiral Schniewind, their conclusions were sent to 
the OKW where he thought they probably reached the staff 
dealing with Norway. When Hitler released Studie Nord 
12 Fuehrer Conferences, 1939, 62-65. 
^^Halder, Diary, 149-150. 
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to the armed forces on January 10 and it was received by 
the SKL, they found that it was "an exposition of the 
whole Norwegian problem, approximately along the same 
14 lines as it was regarded by the Naval War Staff." 
Studie Nord, the first review of German 
"operational possibilities in the northern area," was 
based upon the conviction that the presence of British 
forces in Norway would be "intolerable for German 
strategy" and could be forestalled only by a prior German 
seizure. Considered during a situation discussion on 
January 13, 1940, and included in the War Diary of the 
Naval War Staff, Studie Nord recognized that the Russo-
Finnish conflict was producing a growing enmity for 
Germany in the Nordic countries which would redound to 
Britain's advantage if she were to stage an occupation of 
Norway. A German attack on France would probably be used 
by Great Britain as the signal for entering Norway; and 
if this were attempted, the OKW felt that resistance by 
the Norwegians could scarcely be anticipated.^^ The 
14 ̂ W X, 789-790. Warlimont, Headquarters, 70. 
Haider, Diary, 155. 
M W C_, XXXIV, 181-182. The belief that Britain 
might try to seize Norway when Germany attacked in the 
West was sound, Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the 
British Admiralty, expressed two days later the same 
desire for action in Scandinavia if such an eventuality 
were to arise. See Churchill, Gathering Storm, 555. 
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subsequent handling of the study on Hitler's orders was 
entrusted to a "working staff" under the command of a 
general of the Luftwaffe who would be in charge of any 
eventual operation. Its chief of staff was to be from 
the Navy, and its operations officer from the Army.^^ 
The SKL's War Diary also reveals the divergency 
which had arisen between Raeder's views and those of his 
War Staff. The Grand Admiral remained convinced that 
Great Britain "planned the seizure of Norway within the 
foreseeable future for the complete prevention of any 
German importations from the Norwegian-Swedish area and 
for the complete hindering of the German conduct of war 
on the ocean and the North Sea." The government and a 
large part of the people would be in "considerable, 
quiet agreement" with such British action because of 
their hostile attitude toward Germany. Furthermore, the 
Chief of the SKL asserted, this had been corroborated by 
reports which he had received; and it was his opinion 
that an occupation of Norway would result in extreme 
British pressure on Sweden to minimize her commercial 
transactions with Germany and to force her, if possible, 
into joining with the Allies against the Third Reich. 
^^T M W C, XXXIV, 181-182. 
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Thus, he concluded, a British seizure of Norway "would be 
decisive in the war."^^ 
"In partial contrast to the opinion of the Chief 
of the SKL," its War Diary recorded, "the Operations 
Division of the SKL does not believe in the probability 
of a soon approaching seizure of Norway by England." 
Expressing doubt whether Britain had the strength to make 
such a move, the Operations Division contended that if 
undertaken, it would entail exceedingly high risks— 
placing Britain in a "strong and extremely undesirable 
opposition to Russia" and evoking the strongest response 
from Germany, namely, "an immediate widening of the German 
operational base into Denmark and, if necessary, into 
Sweden" which would seriously threaten any British action 
in southern Norway. A rapid German thrust into Sweden, 
moreover, could effectively anticipate and transcend any 
British pressure in that direction from Norway; and it 
seemed "relatively improbable that Britain could free 
sufficient forces for employment in Norway to offset this 
X8 threat from Germany. 
On the other hand, if there were no danger of a 
British invasion, the Operations Staff was convinced 
M W C, XXXIV, 183. See also Raeder, My Life, 
305-306. 
1 ft 
T M W C, XXXIV, 183-184. 
53 
that 
an occupation of Norway by Germany would 
be strategically and economically a 
dangerous undertaking since after a 
German seizure of Norway the security of 
neutral, Norwegian territorial waters 
would be abolished and because of the 
still inferior naval power of Germany 
at the present, the maintenance of the 
German ore importation from the Norwegian 
area which is especially vital in the 
winter months and the important sea 
connections with Base North and to and 
from overseas could no longer be 
assured. 
Raeder readily acknowledged the accuracy of this latter 
view; and he expressed his conviction that "the most 
favorable solution would doubtlessly be the preservation 
of the status quo" and the "maintenance of the strictest 
neutrality by Norway" since this would allow the 
continued use of her territorial waters without the 
20 danger of interruption by Great Britain. On January 23, 
1940, however. Hitler recalled Studie Nord, abandoned the 
principle of a combined working staff under the leadership 
of a Luftwaffe general, and once again directed that all 
future planning was to be handled "only in the OKW." The 
next day Jodl noted in his diary the "formation of 
Staff N" 21 
19 T M W C, XXXIV, 184-185. 
20 Ibid., 185. 
21. Hubatsch, Die deutsche Besetzunq, 381. 
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Near the conclusion of Admiral Raeder's report to 
the Ftihrer on January 26, the official naval record 
discloses that Hitler remained confident that Norway and 
Sweden were still "determined to maintain strict 
neutrality" in spite of the fact that Winston Churchill 
had made a radio appeal to the Scandinavian countries on 
January 20 asking them, in essence, to join with the 
Allies. BrMuer had reported on January 24 the hostile 
22 Norwegian reaction to Churchill's speech as well as 
about the connivance Norway desired from Germany in 
explaining the sinking of three ships within her terri­
torial waters in order to sustain the fagade of impartial 
23 neutrality and obviate any British action against Norway. 
G F P, VIII, 695-696. 
23 The loss of the Thomas Walton and the Deptford 
(British) and the Garaufalia (Greek) had evoked from the 
British Government severe protests and the threat that if 
there were any repetitions of the sinkings. Great Britain 
would also send her naval forces into Norwegian waters. 
The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Halvdan Koht 
informed BrSuer that the Norwegian Government had replied 
"in the sharpest manner conceivable," had stated that no 
proof of German naval activity in their waters had yet 
been uncovered but a request for an explanation would be 
made to the German Government, and had denied the 
legality of Britain's threat while closing "with the 
statement that any use of force within the boundaries of 
Norwegian sovereignty would be countered with force by 
Norway to the limit of her powers." Koht appealed to 
BrSuer requesting "some sort of reply as quickly as 
possible" from Germany which could be published by Norway, 
stating that they were "not at all concerned with the 
nature of the reply, just so it was satisfactory to the 
extent that Norway could point out that the three incidents 
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In this context, Raeder openly expressed his concern to 
Hitler over the fact that the German Foreign Ministry had 
asked Sweden to mine her own territorial waters. Although 
Sweden had rejected the request, Raeder feared that Great 
Britain would make the same demand of Norway once she 
learned that Germany had been exerting pressure on Sweden. 
He also cautioned that only "the presence of heavy German 
ships d^. e_. , battleships prevents the British from 
launching attacks with light forces against our ore 
24 traffic from Narvik." 
Once again, Raeder chose to evade the evidence of 
Norway's determination to retain her neutrality against 
had been brought to a conclusion unobjectionable under 
international law, that Norway's reaction had been 
correct and Germany's reply equally correct." Koht then 
told BrSuer confidentially that the Deptford had been 
sunk within territorial waters, the others on the 
borderline or just beyond it, and that there was no 
"positive proof of torpedoing." BrSuer requested that a 
satisfactory reply be quickly sent to Norway in order to 
deny Britain any opportunity to interfere with German 
shipping. D G F. VIII, 697-698. 
The desired reply was forwarded on January 31 
wherein the German Navy acknowledged the torpedoing of 
the Deptford as an "armed enemy ship" which was reported 
by the submarine commander to have been "immediately 
outside" Norwegian territorial waters, but the other two 
sinkings were denied on the grounds that there were no 
German submarines in the vicinity when they had occurred. 
If the submarine commander miscalculated his position and 
Norwegian territorial waters had been violated, the German 
Government conveyed its sincere regrets and the assurance 
that German naval forces had been "instructed uncondi­
tionally to respect" Norway's territorial limit and that 
there would be "no repetition" of the incident. N ̂  A, 
Supp. A, 955-956. 
24 
Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, I, 1, 3-4, and 8-9. 
56 
any intervention and instead emphasized the danger of 
British action. Hoping to play upon Hitler's emotions 
and possibly to establish a "priority on worry" since the 
offensive in the West had been postponed on January 20 
until the spring, Raeder sought to center Hitler's 
attention on the fear of an interruption of the Scandi­
navian ore traffic, if not of an Allied occupation of 
Norwegian bases. 
The Chief of the OKW Keitel issued a top secret 
directive on January 27 to the commanders in chief of the 
three services which began: 
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the 
Armed Forces desires that work on the 
Study 'N' be continued under his personal 
and immediate influence and in closest 
collaboration with the conduct of the war 
as a whole. For these reasons the 
Fuehrer has ordered me to take charge of 
the further preparations. 
Therefore, Keitel ordered a working staff to be estab­
lished within the OKW which would provide the "nucleus of 
the future operations staff;" and each of the three 
services was requested to supply an officer suitable as 
an operations officer and also trained, if possible, in 
handling organization and logistical problems. There 
were also to be an intelligence officer appointed, a 
transport expert, a signal communications officer, and an 
C A, VI, 883. 
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officer to handle "general questions of territorial admin­
istration" on the working staff. Henceforth, all prepa-
2 6 rations were placed under the code name "Weserfibung. " 
Hitler's wish to exercise close personal super­
vision over any undertaking and the necessity of 
integrating an amphibious operation of the magnitude 
required to seize Norway into overall strategic planning 
were two plausible reasons for these organizational and 
command changes. Another may have been the desire to 
provide greater flexibility, as well as to reduce friction 
and to avoid as far as possible the tendency for 
inter-service rivalry in combined operations, by 
simplifying the staff structure and by granting co-equal 
representation to the services on a staff within the OKW. 
The responsibility for planning was thereby shifted from 
the service commands under the leadership of one of their 
own number [ d^. e_. , a Luftwaffe general] to an operations 
officer representing each staff who could maintain liaison 
with his respective branch. Other reasons, indicated by 
Walter Warlimont, were: Hitler's decision to utilize the 
organizational changes as the easiest means by which to 
cut short Luftwaffe aspirations aroused by Jodl's 
27 premature contacts with von Sternberg and Jeschonnek; 
^^"Weser Exercise." N ̂  A, VI, 883. 
^^Supra, 44-46. 
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also Hitler's conviction that he himself possessed the 
best qualifications for commanding such a difficult 
operation as Weserdbung and that the Commander in Chief 
of the Luftwaffe Hermann Goering and his General Staff 
were not adequately trained for planning this undertaking; 
and his realization that the Navy rather than the 
Luftwaffe would bear the major responsibility for its 
28 execution. Obviously, the OKM which was concerned 
primarily with naval affairs could not command a combined 
operation; nor would it transfer control over its forces 
to the Luftwaffe—hence the combined staff headed by 
Hitler and Keitel within the OKW. 
General Keitel's directive of January 27, 1940, 
forms the transition between the theoretical evaluation 
of a Norwegian operation and the commencement of actual 
preparations for the undertaking. It represents, moreover, 
the shift from efforts on the part of Raeder to convince 
Hitler and to encourage his commitment in support of a 
Norwegian venture—to the acceptance of the necessity for 
positive action if danger threatened and to concomitant 
decisive preparations being set in motion in the OKW: but 
Hitler still had not committed himself to executing an 
29 invasion. 
28 Warlimont, Headquarters, 70-71. 
29 See Derry, Campaicrn, 17-18. 
CHAPTER IV 
A "SPECIAL STAFF" AND THE 
ALTMARK INCIDENT 
On January 30, 1940, Captain Theodor Krancke, 
coitunander of the cruiser Admiral Scheer, was appointed by 
General Keitel as the ranking officer on the "special 
staff" for Wesertlbunq which also included Luftwaffe 
Colonel Knaus and Army Lieutenant Colonel von Tippelskirch. 
Keitel told them that their task was to "prepare the 
operational plans for the contingency of an occupation of 
N o r w a y . O n  F e b r u a r y  5  w h e n  t h e  " s p e c i a l  s t a f f "  f i r s t  
met to begin work and received its official instructions, 
the representative of the Luftwaffe was not present, 
indicating Goering's displeasure at Hitler's refusal to 
place a Luftwaffe officer in command of the "special 
staff"; and for the first few days, work proceeded with 
2 only the naval and army officers present. 
^T W C, X, 777. 
2 Warlimont, Headquarters, 70-71. General Alfred 
Jodl's Diary, 1 February to 26 May 1940, quoted in N £ A, 
IV, 377-411—380, February 5, 1940. Hereafter cited as 
Jodl's Diary, N ̂  A, IV. 
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The Chief of the OKW had informed Krancke and his 
colleague that a German occupation of Norway had to be 
considered as a probable result if intelligence reports 
like those already received indicating enemy preparations 
for a similar operation were to increase. If an enemy 
occupation of Norway did occur, it would not only severely 
threaten the ore shipments "so urgent for the war" but 
also pose a "decisive danger to the Reich defense." 
Therefore, Keitel emphasized, it was imperative to 
forestall the Allies; but this would be successful "only 
if the preliminary work remained absolutely secret." 
"Complete surprise" was the "prerequisite for success" 
because of German naval inferiority; and "no one," Keitel 
stated emphatically, "with the exception of a precisely 
defined number of officers in the OKW and the three High 
3 Commands, was to know anything about this kind of work." 
Secrecy was considered so essential that for the first 
time, according to General Jodl, an operation was prepared 
4 without the collaboration of the Army General Staff. 
The "special staff" worked in close association 
with Colonel Warlimont's Section L in the OKW to which it 
directed all requests for data, aerial reconnaissance, or 
special assistance. Since the German General Staff had 
^T W C, X, 779. 
"^Ibid. , 755. 
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never studied Scandinavia and even maps could not be 
secured, the staff had only "generalized considerations" 
from Studie Nord and three memoranda from the respective 
High Commands of the services with which to begin. Of 
the latter, the one from the High Command of the Navy 
alone proved useful; and only by late February 1940 were 
maps produced from tour guides, travel maps, hydrographic 
charts, and other related materials. Additional reports 
continued to arrive via Section L concerning the 
activities of British naval officers, dressed as civilians, 
in Norway's west coast ports and of general staff officers 
5 from France traveling in Norway. 
The issue of Norwegian neutrality was again raised 
on February 16, 1940, when a British destroyer flotilla, 
led by Captain Philip Vian in the H. M. S. Cossack, 
intercepted the German tanker Altmark in territorial 
waters along the southwestern coast of Norway. After 
successfully eluding Allied air and sea patrols on her 
return from the South Atlantic where she had served as an 
auxiliary supply vessel for the Graf Spee and had taken 
aboard three hundred captured British seamen, the Altmark 
was first sighted on February 14 after passing through 
the Denmark Strait and reaching Norwegian territorial 
waters near Trondheim. Under orders to proceed without 
W C, X, 777-780 and 790-791. Warlimont, 
Headquarters, 70. 
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halting,^ the vessel nevertheless took refuge in JOssing 
Fjord when one of the British destroyers attempted to 
stop her. Two Norwegian torpedo boats guarded the vessel 
and successfully protested the attempt by the two 
destroyers to board her. The Norwegians explained that 
the Altmark had been examined, found to be unarmed, and 
given permission to continue to Germany via Norwegian 
territorial waters whereupon the destroyers withdrew. 
When the Admiralty heard about this, Winston 
Churchill with the backing of the British Foreign Office 
ordered Captain Vian to board the Altmark and free the 
prisoners unless the Norwegians agreed to escort the ship 
jointly to Bergen with a British-Norwegian guard on board. 
During the evening of February 15, the Cossack entered 
Jftssing Fjord; and disregarding protests from the 
Norwegians, Vian carried out his orders in contravention 
of international law. Six German sailors were killed in 
the ensuing encounter and six wounded, but the torpedo 
boats did not attempt to defend Norway's neutral rights. 
The British seamen were freed, and the Cossack departed 
7 for the Firth of Forth. 
G F P, VIII, 700. 
K Q.' X' 791-792. Churchill, Gathering Storm, 
561-563. D G F P, VIII, 699-700, 776, and 779-783. 
Raeder, Life, 306. 
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The Norwegian Government submitted a vehement 
protest to Great Britain over this violation of its 
territorial rights, but Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain 
justified his country's action on the grounds of humanity 
and prior complicity of the Norwegian Government in 
breaking international law by allowing its territorial 
waters to be used by a German "'warship'" for the express 
"'purpose of escaping capture on the high seas and of 
8 conveying British prisoners to a German prison camp.'" 
The Norwegian Government was, in Churchill's subsequent 
opinion, "quivering under the German terror and exploiting 
9 our forbearance." 
Recalling the case of the City of Flint, this 
breach of neutrality and the passivity of the Norwegian 
warships "justified German misgivings as to whether Norway 
was ready to defend her neutrality as keenly against Great 
Britain as she had done against Germany.The warning 
was there for all to see, or so it seemed, that the Leads 
would not remain a safe passageway in the future; and it 
also appeared entirely possible that Great Britain would 
Q 
Quoted in Churchill, Gathering Storm, 564. 
9 Ibid. 
^'^Supra, 27-28. 
^^Ruge, Per Seekrieg, 82. 
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now occupy Norwegian bases if they could be secured 
without fighting. Indeed, the Altmark incident, Raeder 
contends in his memoirs, "proved without a doubt that 
Norway was completely helpless to maintain its neutrality 
even if the Norwegian Government wished to do so, which 
12 obviously not all authorities did." 
No wonder Adolf Hitler reacted in anger when he 
was informed of the incident. Admiral Voss was present; 
and he later recalled, "'The British attack on the Altmark 
proved decisive, in its effect on Hitler—it was the "fuse" 
13 that touched off the Norwegian offensive.Hitler 
reasoned that if Britain would violate Norway's neutrality 
for the sake of a group of imprisoned British seamen, how 
much more likely would she be to cut off the vital iron 
ore supplies from Narvik and Kirkenes. He quickly became 
convinced that an invasion would have to be carried out 
if for no other reason than to beat the British at their 
14 own game. 
Hitler equally precipitantly dispelled previous 
hesitations which he had harbored, and on February 19 he 
^^Raeder, My; Life, 306. 
13 Quoted in B. H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals 
Talk (New York: Berkley Publishing Corporation, 1958), 34. 
^"^Ibid. , 33-34. TWC, X, 780. 
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insisted strenuously upon the swift preparation of 
Wesertlbunq and ordered General Jodl to fit out steamships 
15 and to place unxts in readiness. Actual experience had 
belied prior reasoning with regard to the effectiveness 
of the Krancke staff for Jodl had found that Krancke's 
"'special staff' formed no better basis or framework for 
an effective command organization than did the OKW 
Operations Staff itself." Therefore, he concluded that 
the rapid implementation of the Ftlhrer' s wishes "could 
only be achieved by a properly organized headquarters 
provided with all the necessary resources for exercising 
c o m m a n d . H i t l e r  a p p r o v e d  h i s  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  a  
commanding general with his corps staff be appointed to 
17 control the operation. A corps headquarters was the 
lowest feasible level of command organization which could 
be in charge of this work, and the OKW decided to secure 
it without informing the High Command of the Army about 
18 Hitler's intentions. 
^^Jodl's Diary, N C A, IV, 385. 
^^Warlimont, Headquarters, 71-72. 
^^Jodl's Diary, N C A, IV, 385. 
18 Warlimont, Headquarters, 72. 
CHAPTER V 
THE APPOINTMENT OF FALKENHORST 
General Wxlhelm Keitel suggested to Adolf Hitler on 
February 20, 1940, that General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, 
Commanding General of the XXI Corps, be appointed to 
command the Norwegian operation since he had had overseas 
experience in Finland at the close of World War I. The 
Central Department for Personnel Questions of the Army 
General Staff was simply informed that Hitler wanted to 
talk with General von Falkenhorst. A telegram immediately 
summoned Falkenhorst to Berlin; and the next day at 
11 A. M., he was interviewed by Hitler in the Reich 
Chancellery and charged with the conduct of operations 
against Norway and Denmark.^ 
During his interrogation at Nuremberg, Falkenhorst 
recounted this interview with Hitler in the presence of 
Keitel and Jodl as well as describing his subsequent role 
^N C A, Supp. B, 1534-1535. T W C, X, 780. 
Haider, Diary, 202. Jodl's Diary, N £ A, IV, 385. 
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in Wesertlbunq; 
I entered the room and I was made to sit 
down on a chair. Then I had to tell the 
Fuehrer about the operations in Finland 
in 1918. That is, how the transportation 
had worked out, our cooperation with the 
Navy, and so on.^ 
The reasons for the occupation of Norway, given by Hitler, 
were three: (1) the preclusion of "strategic outflanking 
by England" which would lead them to attack the unde­
fended Baltic coast and to strike into the heart of 
Germany thereby breaking "the spine" of both Eastern and 
Western fronts; (2) obtaining "freedom of operations for 
the German Navy from the Bay of Wilhelmshaven;" and 
(3) the protection of overseas imports, "especially ores 
from Norway," traversing the Norwegian Leads. Twice 
Hitler emphasized that Norway was "'important for the 
conduct of the war, necessary for the conduct of the war, 
3 and decisive in the conduct of the war.'" 
Five divisions were to be placed at Falkenhorst's 
disposal by the OKH; and since "the thing had been worked 
out during the winter," he was told that only the large 
harbors and the adjacent towns were to be considered in 
any landings. Hitler then stated that the operation was 
not to be "directed against the Norwegian people" and 
^N C A, Supp. B, 1536. 
3 Quoted by Falkenhorst in N C A, Supp. B, 1534-
1537. T M W C, XXXIX, 57-58. 
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that "it was his intention to occupy only the coasts of 
4 Norway and Denmark." 
Falkenhorst was dismissed but ordered to return at 
5 P. M. that afternoon with an outline of how he planned 
to utilize the five divisions and what his "working 
program" would be. Then, Falkenhorst related at Nuremberg, 
I...went to town and bought a Baedeker, 
a travel guide, in order to find out 
just what Norway was like. ...I had no 
idea about the whole thing. ...I didn't 
even know what I was facing.^ 
He went to his hotel to read the Baedeker and to ponder 
the disposition of the five divisions. At 5 P. M. he 
returned to the Reich Chancellery and reported to Hitler. 
After they had discussed the problem briefly and decided 
that the nature of Norwegian harbors demanded the commit­
ment of the divisions to Oslo, Stavanger, Bergen, 
Trondheim, and Narvik respectively, the Ftlhrer "insisted 
on absolute secrecy" in order that the Allies would 
remain ignorant of German intentions. Consequently, 
Falkenhorst was enjoined to transfer to Berlin only 
those members of his corps staff who would be absolutely 
required for preparing the operation. Hitler told 
\ C A, Supp. B, 1537-1538. 
^Ibid.. 1538. 
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Falkenhorst that he should "hurry up" his work since 
"things were very urgent" and then dismissed him. 
Either General Fritz Promm, Commander of the 
Replacement Army, or Colonel Hans von Greiffenberg, Chief 
of the OKH's Operations Section, both of whom were present 
on February 21, presumably was responsible for first 
transmitting to the Army Chief of Staff details about 
7 WeserflbuncT and the results of these discussions. 
General Franz Haider noted in his war diary that the 
Seventh Air Division, the Twenty-second Infantry Division, 
two divisions with assault equipment, one regiment of the 
First Mountain Division, the Eleventh Rifle Brigade 
reinforced with tanks, and a selection of commanding 
officers had been marked out for the coming operation and 
that other forces had to be placed in readiness because 
g 
the Luftwaffe demanded the occupation of Denmark. Keitel 
and Jodl bypassed the OKH and consulted directly with 
Fromm concerning the choice of units. He advised that 
% C A, Supp. B, 1538-1540. 
^Jodl's Diary, N C A, IV, 385-386. See also Haider, 
Diary, 204. Haider cited "Heusinger" (Lieutenant Colonel 
Adolf Heusinger, a department chief within the Operations 
Section of the OKH) as his source of information regarding 
Weserttbunq. Thus, Greif fenberg was the more likely 
intermediary. 
8 
Haider, Diary, 204. 
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only those supplied with German equipment should be 
9 employed. Haider transcribed the reason given for this 
deliberate neglect of the established chain of command: 
"Headquarters XXI shall be subordinated to the OKW in 
order to avoid difficulties owing to the Luftwaffe." He 
also noted that Wesertlbung was scheduled to take place 
"shortly after the offensive in the West has come to a 
certain conclusion. Then, however, as fast as possible. 
The Commander in Chief of the German Navy reported 
to the Ftlhrer on February 23, and Hitler questioned him 
about the possibility of maintaining iron ore shipments 
from Narvik after Norway had been occupied. Raeder 
evidently was interested in applying the brakes to Hitler's 
pressing desire at the moment for action. He stressed: 
The best thing for maintaining this 
traffic as well as for the situation in 
general is the maintenance of Norwegian 
neutrality. 
What Germany must not permit, however, was a British 
occupation of Norway since it "could not be undone" and 
would result in the "cessation of all ore supplies from 
Sweden." 
^Jodl's Diary, N C A, IV, 385. 
^'^Halder, Diary, 204. 
^^My italics. Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, I, 14. 
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It seemed as if Raeder were advocating an invasion 
only in case of demonstrated imperative necessity; and he 
again warned that occupying Norway "would cause the ore 
traffic...to be completely suspended at least for a time, 
since the protection of sea traffic is very difficult 
even along the inter-island route..." But he tempered 
his wariness with impelling observations which could 
encourage offensive operations: 
However only about 2,500,000 to 
3,500,000 tons per year would be lost, 
while if the British occupied Norway, 
all supplies would be cut off. If 
Germany occupies Norway, she can also 
exert heavy pressure on Sweden, which 
would then be obliged to meet all our 
demands. 
A discussion of technical problems followed, and 
Raeder directed attention to the difficulty in synchro­
nizing the occupation of northern Norway by naval 
transports with the occupation of the southern areas by 
air. He thought that sea transportation should be by 
naval store ships or steamers which could average "about 
20 knots;" and he proposed that the supply ships and 
possibly the troop carriers also should go to Base North 
first since they would be closer to northern Norwegian 
ports at the commencement of the invasion. Hitler 
12 Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, I, 14. 
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indicated that the OKW would be instructed to examine 
13 these problems. 
A memorandum, sent the day before Raeder's 
conference with Hitler from the War Economy and Armaments 
Division of the OKW to the OKM and included as "Annex 2" 
in the naval record of the February 23 conference, sheds 
light on the recurring anxiety manifested whenever the 
possibility of an interruption of the Norwegian ore 
traffic was broached, as well as on Raeder's unexpected 
concern that an invasion of Norway should not be under­
taken unnecessarily. It stated that in 1940 Norway was 
committed to deliver to Germany 1,200,000 tons of iron 
14 ore "poor in phosphorus, mainly via Kirkenes." 
An agreement between Germany and Sweden had 
specified, the annex continued, that ten million tons of 
iron ore would be delivered to the former during 1940, 
but Swedish authorities had told Germany that it would 
be necessary to ship two to three million tons via 
15 Narvik. If Germany could arrange for the storage of 
13 Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, I, 14. 
^"^Ibid. , 18-19. 
15 
Since the beginning of the war, Norway had made 
the following iron ore deliveries to Germany: 
"September 80,000 tons 
October 27,000 tons 
November 21,000 tons 
December 73,000 tons 
January 40,000 tons." Fuehrer 
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iron ore during the winter while the Bothnian ports were 
frozen shut, the annex's authors decided that Sweden 
could ship "via Lulea up to: 6,000,000 tons" and "via 
Oxeloesund at least: 3,000,000 tons" leaving one million 
tons or less to be shipped via Narvik; but they had 
learned that Germany could not depend on receiving nine 
million tons or more through the Bothnian ports during 
1940 because 
1. Owing to unfavorable weather condi­
tions shipments from Lulea will 
begin later than usual.... 
2. Accumulated stocks do not exceed 
normal figures. 
3. The ore railroad Lulea-Narvik will 
have to carry the additional load 
of supplies for Finland.^® 
Hence deliveries via Narvik would have to be maintained 
throughout 1940 in order to supply the differential as 
well as the normal complement of ore from Sweden; and this 
information from the War Economy and Armaments Division of 
the OKW probably contributed to Raeder's apparent desire 
to avoid launching an unnecessary operation against Norway. 
Conferences, 1940, 
Swedish ore 
"September 
October 
November 
December 
January 
Ibid. 
I, 18-19. 
deliveries were 
590,000 
as follows: 
tons 
795,000 tons 
873,000 tons 
ca. 661,000 tons 
490,000 tons 
(including 118,000 
t. via Narvik) 
(including 260,000 
t. via Narvik)." 
16 Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, I, 18-19. 
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On February 24 picked members of General Nikolaus 
von Falkenhorst's headquarters staff arrived in Berlin 
17 and began work. The "specxal staff" in the OKW for 
Norwegian planning headed by Captain Theodor Krancke was 
incorporated into the Staff Falkenhorst, and Krancke not 
only provided the link with prior naval planning but also 
continued to maintain direct contact with the SKL while 
serving as Chief of Staff for the Navy with the Staff 
Falkenhorst. From this point forward, however, the Navy's 
role in planning was directly linked and generally 
subordinated to Staff Falkenhorst except for Raeder's 
conferences with Hitler. Krancke remained the only 
direct channel to the Staff for presentation of naval 
views concerning the operation. In addition. Section L 
headed by Warlimont worked closely with Falkenhorst's 
staff; and Warlimont served as "a kind of deputy chief of 
18 staff" under Falkenhorst. 
Between February 21 when the Ftlhrer interviewed 
Falkenhorst and February 24 when members of his corps 
staff arrived in Berlin, Hitler "demanded the immediate 
submission of the operational plans." Falkenhorst, to 
^^Jodl's Diary, N C A, IV, 387. 
1 ft 
T W C, X, 755, 778, and 780. N C A, Supp. B, 
1539. Warlimont, Headquarters, 72. 
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comply, submitted the plan on which he was working 
although it did not meet with his own approval. Hitler 
approved it nevertheless. In the weeks which followed, 
the detailed elaboration of Wesertlbunq was thus carried 
19 
out by the Staff Falkenhorst. 
General von Falkenhorst exercised an independent 
command directly subordinate to the Supreme Commander of 
the Armed Forces, but his staff had to rely on Section L 
for decisions about questions which were not settled 
between Falkenhorst and Hitler. Moreover, Section L was 
responsible for determining the sources of troops or 
materiel required for the invasion and for rendering 
decisions when differences arose between the services. 
Falkenhorst's staff also had to take into consideration 
occasional suggestions made by Hitler, Jodl, or Section L 
20 regarding their preparations. Thus, there arose the 
anomalous situation wherein the Supreme Commander of the 
German Armed Forces exercising his personal control 
placed what essentially was an Army corps headquarters in 
charge of a combined operation and simultaneously 
excluded the OKH and its Operations Staff from the chain 
of command and any control over the decisions of one of 
19 
T W C, X, 778. 
^°Ibid.. 755 and 778. 
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its own components while the corps headquarters could 
utilize as needed other, even superior, elements within 
21 the German Army. 
On February 26, General von Falkenhorst, accom­
panied by his Chief of Staff Colonel Erich Buschenhagen, 
met with Haider, reported on Wesertibung, and demanded 
mountain troops for the invasion. Haider, in turn, 
requested information concerning the number of troops 
required, the proposed assembly area, and their dispo­
sition which Falkenhorst promised to supply before 
officially requesting their deployment. The same day 
Hitler raised the question with General Jodl whether it 
would be better to have Wesertibung precede or follow 
Fall Gelb; and on February 28 Jodl proposed, first to 
Keitel and later to Hitler, that the two operations be so 
organized that they could be carried out independently of 
each other. 
Hitler agreed fully with Jodl's proposal if it 
could be arranged. Jodl explained the new basis for 
further preparations to Falkenhorst when he gave a progress 
report the same afternoon. Four parachute companies, two 
mountain divisions, the Twenty-second Infantry Division 
except for the Sixteenth Infantry Regiment, and two other 
21 See Warlimont, Headquarters, 72-73. 
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divisions were to be employed against Norway. One region­
al defense division, a corps headquarters, one police 
division, and an infantry division were to be allocated 
for Denmark; but Jodl had not decided whether to commit 
the reinforced Eleventh Rifle Brigade against Denmark 
first and then transfer it to Norway or to assign it 
directly to the Norwegian invasion group. 
The report presented the next day by Falkenhorst 
together with Krancke, Buschenhagen, and Knaus proved to 
be very satisfactory to Hitler; and he immediately 
approved the new dispositions. Nevertheless, the Ftlhrer 
wanted an imposing army group in Copenhagen as well as a 
careful study made of exactly how individual coastal 
batteries were to be neutralized by assault detachments. 
Hitler then directed Warlimont to execute the requisite 
order for the impending operation. It was to be sent at 
once to the three branches of the armed forces; and at 
Jodl's suggestion, it was also decided that transport 
22 ships should be fitted out immediately. 
^^Halder, Diary, 205-215. N C A, IV, 387-388. 
CHAPTER VI 
HITLER'S DIRECTIVE 
The formal "Directive for 'Fall Wesertibung'" was 
issued by Adolf Hitler on March 1, 1940, through the 
National Defense Section of the OKW's Operations Staff to 
the commanders in chief of the three armed services.^ 
Utilizing the plan drawn up by Falkenhorst and his staff 
and just approved by the Ftihrer, General Jodl composed 
the original draft of the directive which Warlimont's 
2 section then "'put in final form'" and Hitler signed. 
It delineated the procedures to be followed as well as 
the rationale and the strategic and tactical objectives 
of the operation: 
The development of the situation in 
Scandinavia requires the making of all 
D G F P, VIII, 831-833. See also N C A, VI, 
1003-1005, and H. R. Trevor-Roper, ed., Hitler's War 
Directives, 1939-1945 (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 
Ltd., 1964), 23-24. 
2 Quoted in Warlimont, Headquarters, 74. N ̂  A, IV, 
388. 
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preparations for the occupation of 
Denmark and Norway by a part of the 
Wehrmacht (Fall Weser^bung). This 
operation should prevent British 
encroachment on Scandinavia and the 
Baltic. Further it should guarantee 
our ore base in Sweden and give our 
Navy and Luftwaffe a wider start-line 
against Britain. 
The Navy and the Luftwaffe were charged with 
protecting the operation "within the limits of their 
capabilities" against counterattacks by British air and 
naval forces. Since Germany's political and military 
strength so far transcended that of the Scandinavian 
countries, the force used against Denmark and Norway was 
to be "kept as small as possible;" but this "numerical 
weakness" was to be offset "by daring actions and surprise 
execution." German forces were to do their "utmost" in 
order to give the appearance of "a peaceful occupation" 
whose object was to protect militarily Scandinavian 
neutrality. "Corresponding demands" would be sent to the 
governments involved when the operation began; but, the 
directive continued, "if necessary, naval and air 
demonstrations will provide the necessary emphasis." Yet, 
if resistance were encountered, "all military means" would 
4 be employed to smash it. 
G F P, VIII, 831. 
^Ibid. 
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Hitler reaffirmed General von Falkenhorst's assign­
ment both to prepare and to conduct Weserflbung under his 
direct supervision. The combined forces were named 
"Group XXI" and made a separate command. They could not 
be used in any other operational theater. The directive 
also ordered that Falkenhorst's staff be brought up to 
strength by additions from all three armed services and 
that those Luftwaffe components detailed for Wesertlbung 
were to function tactically under the control of 
Group XXI. When the latter had completed their duties, 
they would return to the Luftwaffe's control. Employment 
of other air and naval forces which remained under their 
respective branches' direct command would be by mutual 
agreement with General von Falkenhorst. The individual 
branches of the armed services, however, were to admin­
ister and to supply the units which they had contributed, 
subject to the orders of the Commanding General, Group 
XXI. ̂ 
"The crossing of the Danish border and the landings 
in Norway must take place simultaneously," Hitler's 
directive ordered; and he emphasized that Weserflbung had 
to be "prepared as quickly as possible" so that Germany 
could respond immediately if the Allies seized the 
initiative. The overriding factor in the entire operation 
G F P, VIII, 831-832. 
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was that the Allies and the Scandinavian countries alike 
"should be taken b^ surprise." Both leaders and troops 
were to be misled about the real objectives of the 
operation and only informed after the invasion vessels 
had put to sea. Wesertlbung was divided into Wesertlbung 
Stld—the occupation of Denmark—and Wesertlbuncf Nord—the 
occupation of Norway.^ 
In the Norwegian undertaking Group XXI was 
ordered to execute by surprise the amphibious seizure 
of the leading seaports. Yet, the responsibility for 
preparing and then transporting the landing troops was 
transferred to the Navy's direct control by Hitler's 
directive; and the meager naval forces were also enjoined 
to provide escort protection for the transportation of 
reserves and supplies to Norway as well as to convey the 
additional forces required as the operation progressed. 
The added burden of providing for the rapid establishment 
of coastal defenses in Norway was also placed upon the 
Navy by Hitler. The Luftwaffe, on the other hand, was 
specifically ordered with regard to Norway only to "ensure 
air defense" and to utilize Norwegian air bases for 
attacks on Great Britain after the occupation had been 
completed.^ 
G F P, VIII, 832. 
^Ibid., 832-833. 
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Group XXI was then instructed to report its 
progress regularly to the OKW and to inform them of 
"the shortest necessary space of time between the issue 
of the order for Wesertlbung and its execution..." 
Finally, the code names to be used were "Wesertag—the 
day of the operation" and "Weserzeit—the hour of the 
operation. 
Thus, Grand Admiral Raeder's, Rear Admiral D5nitz's, 
and Admiral Carls' desire for Norwegian bases received 
explicit sanction from the Ftihrer. The same general, 
strategic reasons, in addition to the question of protect­
ing the ore route, were used by him to justify an invasion 
of Norway as Raeder had first advanced in early October 
9 1939. Raeder's "extending the operational base to the 
North"^*^ had been translated into Hitler's "a wider 
start-line against Britain.It should be recognized, 
as Raeder was very careful to point out in his memoirs, 
that "no definite order was given to implement the plans, 
12 nor was any time set for the operation to begin;" but 
G F P, VIII, 833. 
9 ^Ibid. 
^°N C A, VI, 928. 
G F P, VIII, 831, 
^^Raeder, My Life, 307. See also T M W C, IV, 433. 
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the implicit doubt injected by Raeder whether the 
invasion would have been carried out must be countered by 
the realization that the momentum which by this time had 
been created with the preparations for Wesertlbuncr would 
have been hard to reverse, especially in view of Hitler's 
fear of British action which Raeder had contributed so 
much to arouse. 
During the afternoon of March 1, Krancke conferred 
with the SKL concerning Wesertlbung? but Haider noted in 
his war diary that Falkenhorst had not kept his promise 
to inform the OKH about military requirements before 
requesting troops. The OKW ordered the Army to release a 
corps command, one mountain division, four other divi­
sions, two motorized reconnaissance detachments, and ten 
medium batteries for Weseri!lbunq. Fury erupted in the OKH 
13 over these transfers, and the Army consulted wxth 
Keitel. Jodl personally met with Jeschonnek; but he 
bowed to Luftwaffe wishes and reduced the aircraft 
requirements. No protests and no discussion of requests 
with the Navy were recorded. Krancke testified after the 
war that "the Naval War Staff, like myself, was aware of 
the fact that this operation would signify the complete 
^^Jodl's Diary, N C A, IV, 388. 
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14 commitment of the navy." 
With reference to Jodl's troop assignments made 
15 on February 28, a later entry in Haider's diary for 
March 1 suggested that Luftwaffe General Leonhard Kaupisch 
and part of his headquarters (XXXI Corps) be assigned to 
Wesertibunq. The SS-Death's Head Division would replace 
Jodl's police division as well as the two motorized 
reconnaissance detachments just requested plus a motorized 
engineer detachment and a mechanized transport regiment. 
Hitler vetoed this proposal. He wanted a "simple 
division" instead. The Eleventh Motorized Rifle Brigade 
which would be ready by March 5 would also be committed 
along with the Third Mountain Division, two-thirds of the 
Twenty-second Division, and the Sixty-ninth, 212th, and 
195th divisions. A later notice from the Reich Chancellery, 
however, informed Haider that Hitler wanted the Twenty-
second Division left for Fall Gelb.^^ 
The Commander in Chief of the Army, Walter von 
Brauchitsch, met with Keitel on March 2, and they settled 
^ 4 
T W C, X, 780. Haider, Diary, 215. Jodl's 
Diary, N ̂  A, IV, 388. Warlimont, Headquarters, 74. War 
Diary of the Naval War Staff, March 1, in T W C, X, 765. 
^^Supra, 76-77. 
^^Halder, Diary, 216. 
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the question of troops. Brauchitsch pointed out that 
fully twenty per cent of the Army's reserves were involved 
in Weserttbunq. "No word" about the invasion, Haider wrote 
in his diary, "has been exchanged between the Ftlhrer and 
the Commander in Chief of the Army, That must be written 
17 down for military history." 
Field Marshal Goering, however, was not reticent 
in his views. He raged at Keitel, and then went to see 
Hitler during the afternoon of March 2 about the 
Luftwaffe assignments. Consequently, after further 
consultations with the Luftwaffe and the Army, the OKW 
submitted new and somewhat lower requirements; but the 
Navy and the Army were forced to take up the slack. 
Meeting the same day with its Chief, the SKL discussed 
organizational problems connected with the invasion force. 
The SKL and its Chief of Staff Otto Schniewind underlined 
the fact that the difficulties to be met in any invasion 
of Norway demanded the "total commitment of the entire 
navy." "The problem," they asserted, "has now far 
exceeded the purely military field, and has become a 
18 political and war economic question of the first order." 
17 Haider, Diary, 204 and 207. Jodl's Diary, 
N C A, IV, 388-389. 
18 War Diary of the Naval War Staff, March 2, in 
T W C, X, 765. 
86 
The Naval War Staff had completely reversed its 
field, but it refused to subscribe to the strategic 
reasoning advanced by Raeder and Hitler. Instead, the 
SKL averred: 
It is no longer a question of improving 
the strategic position of Germany and of 
obtaining isolated military advantages, 
or of considering the pros and cons of 
the possibilities of carrying out the 
'Weser Exercise,' and of voicing 
military misgivings, but a problem of 
how the armed forces should act with 
lightning speed in accordance with the 
political developments and necessities. 
Their consensus was not sustained; but the die, as far as 
the Navy as a whole was concerned, had been cast. 
On the political side of the question. Ambassador 
BrSuer in Oslo remained convinced that Norway was 
dedicated to a strictly neutral role and the exercise of 
unconditional sovereignty over her own territorial waters. 
t 
He based his conviction on the Norwegian fear that a 
British invasion would result in both a German response 
and a Russian seizure of northern Norway. Another 
substantive reason for his belief was the attitude assumed 
by the Norwegian and Swedish governments and their 
definite refusal on February 27 to entertain Finland's 
19 
War Diary of the Naval War Staff, March 2, in 
T W C, X, 765. 
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request for the granting of transit rights so that she 
could receive Allied troops. BrSuer recognized though 
that in case of a violation of Norway's neutrality, "the 
only thing she can do to defend herself is protest." 
This admission surely was not very palatable to the Third 
Reich, and it offered additional cause for concern. 
BrSuer also revealed that on a number of occasions since 
the Altmark incident British planes had been reported 
20  flyxng over Norwegian coastal waters. 
General von Brauchitsch decided on March 2 to 
allocate the army troops between the Danish and Norwegian 
undertakings. The Third Mountain Division, the 195th 
Reserve Division, six medium batteries for coastal 
defense, and other specialized detachments as well as the 
Sixty-ninth Division, designated for Oslo, were detailed 
for Wesertlbung Nord. General Kaupisch's command head­
quarters for the Danish invasion and the Luftwaffe central 
headquarters for the entire operation were to be located 
in Hamburg, Falkenhorst' s at Ltlbeck, and the Naval 
21 Headquarters at Wesermflnde. 
?0 
D G F P, VIII, 846-847. 
^^Halder, Diary, 217-218. 
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On March 3, an appeal by Great Britain and France 
to Norway and Sweden for troop transit privileges was 
rejected; and Hitler expressed his belief in the 
"necessity of prompt and strong action in Norway..." 
22 "Rapid acceleration" was required. Hitler also demanded 
that the transportation of troops for the operation should 
commence immediately. They were to be conveyed to 
training areas by March 7, and assembly was to be completed 
by March 10. The forces were to be prepared for departure 
by March 13 so that a landing would be possible in the 
most northern regions of Norway by approximately March 17. 
Finally, Hitler decided to begin Wesertibung "several days" 
before Fall Gelb. 
Although Hitler had ordered that there were to be 
no delays by any of the armed services, Goering refused 
to acquiesce to the subordination of Luftwaffe units to 
Falkenhorst's Group XXI. After speaking with Jeschonnek 
on March 4, Jodl conceded the issue. Another alteration 
in Hitler' s directive for Weseri!ibunq was thus secured as 
Jodl, on behalf of the OKW, forfeited the tactical 
control over air units vested in Group XXI. All Luftwaffe 
forces were to be controlled by the Tenth Air Corps at 
^^Jodl's Diary, N C A, IV, 389. 
^^Ibid. Haider, Diary, 218. 
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Hamburg. Any possibility of centralized direction of any 
type over air forces was effectively removed from 
Falkenhorst's hands by the stipulation that the Tenth Air 
Corps was to receive its orders only through the OKL 
24 "upon demand" of Group XXI. 
The original concept of a separate command for 
Wesertlbung under General von Falkenhorst was completely 
sacrificed to what essentially were three distinct 
commands controlled by the OKW with Falkenhorst function-
25 xng primarily as the army commander. That afternoon 
General Karl Bodenschatz complained that Field Marshal 
Goering had been excluded from Wesertlbung while 110 other 
Luftwaffe officers had already been consulted. Jodl 
admitted the "error," and a conference of the three 
commanders in chief with Hitler was scheduled for the 
following day.^^ 
The SKL's staff members presented Raeder with an 
"urgent oral transmission" from the OKW during a situation 
conference on March 4 in which they had been told that 
Adolf Hitler had ordered them to finish all preparations 
^"^Jodl's Diary, N C A, IV, 389. 
25 In the German Armed Forces once Army officers 
boarded a naval vessel, they relinquished their "command 
jurisdiction" to the Navy. See N C A, Supp. B, 1541. 
The distinct command function of the Navy had already 
been established by Hitler in his directive for Weserflbung. 
Supra,78-82. D G F P, VIII, 832. 
^^Jodl's Diary, N ̂  A, IV, 389. Haider, Diary, 
218-219. 
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for Wesertibunq. In fact, all planning for the operation 
was to be completed "by March 10 (J), so that as from that 
date the Fuehrer order the beginning of the action 
with a preparatory period of 4 days." Raeder and the SKL 
agreed that this demand of "the political leadership" had 
to be met. The "present political situation, which makes 
an early military intervention by the Western Powers in 
favor of Finland appear possible in the immediate future" 
27 was the reason gxven for the six day Ixmit. 
SKL held, would have to be considered solely as a "pretext" 
used by the British in order to secure their "real 
strategic aim": severing of ore shipments, application 
of the most severe pressure on Sweden to terminate all 
deliveries to Germany, and the creation of another theatre 
of war thereby "relieving the pressure of the German 
offensive in the West." The circumscribed interval 
assigned required "an unreserved concentration of all 
forces of the navy on this one task," and the SKL called 
off all other approaching operations and held in port 
28 those submarines which were preparing to sail. 
The conference between the three commanders in 
chief of the armed forces and Hitler convened at 3 P. M. 
Intervention in the Russo-Finnish War, the entire 
27 T W C, X, 765. / 
28 Ibid., 765-766. 
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on March 5, and Field Marshal Goering vented "his spleen" 
over the failure to have been consulted concerning 
Wesertlbunq. "He dominates the discussion, " Jodl recalled, 
"and tries to prove that all previous preparations are 
good for nothing." The result? Increased forces were 
allocated for the seizure of Narvik and six divisions in 
total for Norway which exceeded not only the original 
commitment for the entire operation but also the requests 
for troops made by the OKW which Jeschonnek and 
Brauchitsch had previously succeeded in scaling down. 
Warships were to remain in the Norwegian harbors. A 
foothold was to be obtained in Copenhagen at the outset 
of the operation, but the taking of Kristiansand was 
29 initially to be postponed. 
29 Jodl's Dxary, N C A, IV, 390. 
CHAPTER VII 
NAVAL PLANNING 
Grand Admiral Erich Raeder in his capacity as 
Chief of the SKL issued the Naval Directive for Fall 
Wesertlbunq on March 5, 1940, to the Commanding Admirals 
of the Naval Group Command East, Naval Group Command West, 
and the Fleet, who exercised operational control over all 
ships at sea. It rehearsed in large measure both the 
content and import of Hitler's directive of March 1, 1940; 
but it included those changes which had been agreed upon 
in the intervening days. Only points of clarification and 
tactical instructions require repeating here. 
The date for executing Wesertlbung depended on the 
weather but "above all upon the political situation," 
according to Raeder. "Weser Hour" had not been determined 
because the possibility existed that air units would not 
have received enough training for night and blind flying 
by "Weser Day" and would, therefore, require clear, 
daytime flying conditions for the whole journey. 
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Naval forces in the operation were ordered to fly 
the British White Ensign until disembarkation had begun 
at Norwegian and Danish objectives. "In order to increase 
the element of surprise, and because of information on 
hand that the Norwegian Armed Forces are ordered not to 
resist a British invasion by force of arms," the single 
exception to this rule would be the Narvik contingent. 
The reason given by the Naval Directive was that the mil­
itary commander at Narvik, Colonel Sunlo,^ was pro-German 
Colonel Konrad Sunlo was a follower of Vidkun 
Quisling and as early as December 1939 had conveyed his 
pro-Nazi convictions to German leaders. See Fuehrer 
Conferences, 1939, 58-59. He was also one of the few 
Norwegians who supposedly were willing to support active­
ly Quisling's plans for a coup d'etat. The German 
military leadership, however, "considered Rosenberg a 
crank" and refused to sanction Quisling's project. See 
Louis de Jong, German Fifth Column, 170-171 and 174 for 
a refutation of Sunlo's treasonous role. Wiljam Hagelin 
served as the contact between Quisling and Vice Admiral 
Otto Schniewind, Chief of Staff of the SKL, supplying the 
Navy with information concerning Quisling's plans, 
Norwegian political affairs, and military questions which 
the SKL "passed on to the OKW." Statement appended to the 
December 12, 1939, entry in the "War Diary of the C-in-C 
of the Navy," N ̂  A, VII, 1106-1107. Hitler informed 
Rosenberg on February 19 and again on February 29, 1940, 
that he was willing to continue giving Quisling financial 
support, but "he no longer favoured the 'political plan 
of the Norwegians.'" Quoted in Louis de Jong, German 
Fifth Column, 171. This terminated any real consideration 
of military assistance from within Norway except for the 
reference to Sunlo in Raeder's directive to the Navy. 
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and would not try to keep warships flying the German flag 
2 from entering the harbor. 
In Norway, Raeder ordered naval and air transport 
groups to effect surprise landings at Narvik, Trondheim, 
Bergen, Kristiansand, Arendal, and Oslo. "Maximum 
Camouflage" was ordered for all naval units. The 
embarkation of troops and the departure of vessels were 
to take place at night and in localities where the 
activity would not be observed even if this meant 
anchoring off the coast to await the beginning of the 
operation. Provision was also to be made for the fastest 
"possible transfer of antiaircraft artillery to southern 
3 Norway (Oslo, Stavanger, Bergen)." 
The Naval Directive stated that Wesertlbung hinged 
on "the quick bringing forward of the first wave of 
occupation by formations of the navy;" and its "successful 
execution" depended largely "upon the initiative and 
determined will of the leaders of these formations." 
Their weakness had to be compensated for "by bold action 
and surprise execution;" and Raeder ended his directive 
with the conclusion, "The success of the operation means 
4 a decisive step in the further war against England." 
^T W C, X, 767-768. 
^Ibid., 768-769. 
^iMd. , 769. 
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In the Navy's opinion "considerable risks" would 
be associated particularly with any movements to Trondheim 
and Narvik. It was manifest that the "long flank march 
very near the British coast could...easily lead to serious 
setbacks" in the face of British naval strength.^ Raeder, 
the SKL, and the operational commanders considered the 
Norwegian undertaking "very risky"; and Raeder served 
notice to Hitler that he had to expect "the possible 
complete loss of the fleet" or, if they were successful, 
0 "the loss of about 30 percent of the forces used." 
From the beginning to the end of the planning 
phase of the Norwegian undertaking, the opinions held by 
the members of the SKL were usually divided because many 
of them believed that the risks involved "were not in a 
7 proper proportion to the prospects of success." It 
would mean, in fact, "gambling with the entire German 
fleet." Therefore, Jodl asserted in testimony after the 
war, launching this invasion had to be based on "really 
reliable information that Norway was threatened by actual 
danger." For this reason, too, "Weser Day" had not been 
fixed; and it was why Jodl had proposed its complete 
g 
divorcement from Fall Gelb. 
^T W C, X, 793-794. 
M W C, XIV, 310-311. 
^T W C, X, 794. 
®T M W C, XV, 376-377. 
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The SKL had agreed, however, that the decision 
lay with Adolf Hitler and that they would have to forego 
their apprehensions and endeavor to make the invasion a 
success if it were ordered. The alternative before them 
was to maintain the fundamental conditions of secrecy and 
surprise or meet with a total defeat; but since the SKL 
had issued and was issuing the necessary orders, based on 
Hitler's directive and Raeder's directive and commands, 
to subordinate naval agencies, the danger of exposure was 
increased many times.^ 
General Franz Haider ' s outline of the Ftlhrer ' s 
"aimless and haphazard" report concerning the current 
political situation on March 6, 1940, reveals one point of 
striking importance—Hitler had decided to invade Denmark 
and Norway. France and Great Britain had demanded transit 
rights from Norway and Sweden for troops to be sent to 
Finland. He repeated to Haider that all preparations had 
to be completed by March 10. March 15 was designated as 
"Weser Day." Three days later. Hitler hoped to launch his 
major offensive in the West. He then requested from Haider 
flamethrowers for use against fortified batteries at 
Narvik and Bergen and more than the six medium batteries 
which had been assigned to the invasion f orce. 
^T W C, X, 765, 780, and 794-795. 
^'^Halder, Diary, 221. 
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The Sixth-ninth Infantry and the Third Mountain 
divisions possessed the requisite flamethrowers, and this 
helped to determine their deployment. Three fifteen 
centimeter batteries of Turkish origin could be activated 
by Warlimont, Greiffenberg reported to Haider; but they 
could not be supplied with prime movers and would have to 
be manned by the Navy. The 198th and 181st Infantry 
divisions had been assigned to Denmark and Norway 
4- • 1 11 respectively. 
General von Falkenhorst met with Field Marshal 
Goering on March 7, and the distribution of forces was 
stabilized. Hitler then signed a directive embodying 
the final troop deployments and establishing that 
henceforth nothing was to be changed. The Sixty-ninth, 
153rd, 181st, and 196th Infantry divisions and the Third 
Mountain Division were assigned to Norway and the 170th, 
12 198th, and 214th Infantry dxvisxons to Denmark. 
On March 9, Grand Admiral Raeder discussed the 
forthcoming undertaking with his Supreme Commander and 
once again set forth his 
opinion that the occupation of Norway by 
the British could have a decisive effect 
^^Halder, Diary, 221-222. 
^^Ibid., 204-222. Earl F. Ziemke, The German 
Northern Theater of Operations, 1940-1945 (Washington, 
D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), 
19. Hereafter cited as Ziemke, Northern Theater. 
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against Germany, since then Sweden might 
also be drawn into the war against 
Germany and all the ore supplies from 
Sweden would cease. 
Consequently, he concluded that the operation was "urgent" 
because 
The British now have the desired oppor­
tunity, under the pretext of supporting 
the Finns, to send troop transports 
through Norway and Sweden and therefore 
to occupy those countries if they wish. 
Indeed, the introduction to the Grand Admiral's review of 
Wesertlbunq for Adolf Hitler offers one of the most precise 
and explicit expositions not only of his strategic 
conceptions of the Norwegian operation but also of the 
justification for undertaking such a venture: 
The Commander in Chief, Navy feels it 
his duty...to present to the Fuehrer a 
clear picture of the naval operation. 
The operation itself is contrary to all 
principles in the theory of naval 
warfare. According to this theory, it 
could be carried out by us only if we 
had naval supremacy. We do not have 
this; on the contrary, we are carrying 
out the operation in the face of the 
vastly superior British Fleet. In 
spite of this the Commander in Chief, 
Navy believes that, provided surprise 
is complete, our troops can and will 
successfully be transported to Norway. 
On many occasions in the history of 
war those very operations have been 
successful which went against all the 
principles of warfare, provided they 
were carried out by surprise. 
13 Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, I, 20. 
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The crucial moment in all the landings, Raeder 
went on to say, would be the time when they passed the 
coastal defenses on entering the harbors; but he believed 
that surprise would again be efficacious. He did not 
think that the Norwegians would decide to fire in time 
"if they decide to do so at all." Since the British Home 
Fleet had recently been operating out of Scapa Flow, the 
greatest danger for the German vessels would be "the 
.,14 return voyage. 
"Light naval units" would act as a screening and 
diversionary force for the convoys, according to Raeder; 
but the battleships, the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper, 
and "all destroyers from Narvik and Trondheim" had to 
unite in a concerted effort to break through the British 
15 forces. No thought was given to an attempt to elude 
them. The "small cruisers and special service ships" 
from Bergen south had to break through down the coast 
with the Ltitzow' s assistance. "Not one destroyer may be 
left behind," Raeder stressed emphatically controverting 
Hitler's decision of March 5, "let alone a cruiser (the 
Hipper) either in Narvik or in Trondheim, at a time when 
the fate of the German Fleet is hanging in the balance." 
^^Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, I, 20. 
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As protective measures, Raeder planned to station 
submarines along possible approach routes for the British 
Fleet, at Narvik, and along the Norwegian coast and to 
lay aerial mines in Scapa Flow with the hope of damaging 
some capital ships and possibly forcing their withdrawal 
to the Faeroes; but he stressed that the Navy also had to 
16 have the strongest cooperation" from the Luftwaffe. 
In order to foster the impression that "some 
consideration" had been shown for the Soviet Union's 
interests, Raeder suggested telling the Russians after 
17 the occupation that Tromsfl had been left unoccupied. 
"Better, the Russians sit in 'Tromsoe' than the English," 
18 Raeder declared. Hitler did not like the idea of the 
Russians being "so near" and held that Tromsfl would have 
19 to be occupied, too. 
The "virus" of Raeder's strategic thought and 
influence had thoroughly infected Hitler convincing him 
of the crucial value of the Scandinavian theater to the 
war economy and military defense of the Third Reich. 
Indeed, by this time. Hitler was irrevocably committed 
to "his" operation; and it was no longer a question of 
aims, but solely of means. 
16 Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, I, 20. 
^"^Ibid. , 21. 
1 ft 
N C A, VI, 982. 
19 
Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, I, 21. 
CHAPTER VIII 
WESERUBUNG NORD 
Events soon conspired to effect a delay in 
Weserttbunq. As early as March 5, General Haider had 
noted that a peace feeler had passed between the Soviet 
Union and Finland; but two days earlier, Wipert von 
Bltlcher, the German Minister in Helsinki, had learned that 
negotiations had been carried on "for several days" 
between the Russian and Finnish governments "through the 
mediation of the Swedish Foreign Minister." He notified 
the German Foreign Ministry that "the negotiations were 
progressing favorably and at such a pace that their 
conclusion might be a matter of days."^ 
In the meantime, reports of increased Allied 
activity aimed at an occupation of Norwegian ports had 
heightened anxiety in the Ftlhrer' s headquarters which was 
G F P, VIII, 848. See also ibid., 881-882. 
Haider, Diary, 220. 
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mirrored in the frenzied pace of preparations for 
Wesertlbunq. They had even led the German Navy to prepare 
a list of "countermeasures, including the invasion of 
South Norway, to be taken 'on receipt of the first 
intelligence of any British landing in northern or 
2 western Norway.'" 
March 15 had been set as the day for the beginning 
of the German operation; but on March 10, Jodl observed, 
"The news about the Finnish-Russian negotiations are very 
favorable from a political point of view." He obviously 
meant the fact that Russia and Finland were nearing 
agreement; and he related, "The French press rages about 
it because they consider it necessary to cut Germany off 
from the Swedish ores." Yet, he remarked. 
In a military way, the situation is 
disturbing for us, because, if peace 
should be concluded soon, the motivation 
for the prepared action of the group 
Falkenhorst will be difficult.. 
Here is proof that Wesertlbunq had ceased to be 
viewed as a preventive undertaking but had assumed an 
independent validity of its own irrespective of the actual 
military needs of Germany. Jodl's concern clearly was not 
about whether they would or would not have to execute 
2 Quoted in Derry, Campaign, 23. 
^Jodl's Diary, N C A, IV, 391. Haider, Diary, 221. 
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Wesertlbuncf but with the existence of an impelling reason 
which would permit them to take action. If, in the end, 
the Norwegian operation and Germany's strategic require­
ments did partially coincide, this still does not detract 
from the fact that the rational framework had already 
shifted to a new locus leaving to the diplomatic realm 
the responsibility of justifying a fait accompli. 
On March 11, the date of the invasion was put off 
until March 20; and the transports for Weserflbung were 
4 ordered to set sail "about March 17." The information 
received concerning enemy activities included reports 
from Lieutenant Commander Richard Schreiber as well as 
from Hagelin and Quisling that British and French intelli­
gence agents and military attaches were investigating 
5 Norwegian harbors and bridges. The German radxo monitor­
ing service provided "objective confirmation" of these 
reports which came from some sources about whom "one might 
have held some doubts;" and the radio intercepts, 
"particularly in the Norwegian matter, confirmed that... 
movements from the British coast, northern Scottish ports, 
were being planned and prepared." Undoubtedly, the 
progress of the Russo-Finnish War and the fear of an 
4 Haider, Diary, 227. 
^T M W C, XIV, 95. N C A, III, 25. T W C, X, 
780. 
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imminent British assault on Norway help to explain the 
intensity of Hitler's demand for immediate action. 
Finland signed a Treaty of Peace with the Soviet 
Union on March 12, 1940, depriving both the Allies and 
the Third Reich of any excuse for occupying Norway. This 
Jodl clearly recognized at the same time he recorded that 
everything was prepared for action but would have to be 
postponed for one or two days past March 20 because of 
7 "unfavorable ice conditions." 
The Naval War Staff similarily issued a directive 
to naval commanders on March 12 dealing with "Alternate 
Landing Points in Norway" which exposed the overriding 
concern that the British might still beat them to Norway. 
If a "fundamental change" occurred after the beginning of 
the operation, the SKL and Group XXI together would issue 
orders for "evasive tactics." If Great Britain landed 
troops first in western and northern Norway, German 
invasion groups were to proceed "as far north as possible" 
in order to secure southern Norway. Kristiansand, Bergen, 
Trondheim, and Narvik were given code names as alternate 
landing points for other than their own invasion groups in 
order to prepare for this eventuality. Oslo also received 
a code name in case the Oslo Fjord were "completely 
blocked;" but its invasion force was then to debark in 
^T W C, X, 795-796. 
^Jodl' s Diary, N A, IV, 392. Beloff, Foreign 
Policy, 310. 
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Larvik and Sanderfjord and proceed overland to Oslo. If 
"such strong local resistance" were encountered that 
seizing coastal fortifications seemed "hopeless," the 
ranking naval commander in charge of each amphibious 
operation was empowered to determine whether to run the 
gauntlet of fire from the coastal batteries without having 
overpowered them or to shift his forces to an alternate 
landing point.^ 
"Fuehrer does not yet give order for 'W. He is 
still looking for some justification," General Jodl wrote 
on March 13. The sense of urgency lessened somewhat 
although an Allied occupation seemed imminent; but 
starting on March 10, the OKM had begun stationing sub­
marines off the principal Norwegian ports to counter any 
invasion attempt. By March 13, British submarines had 
converged off the Skagerrak; and an intercepted radio 
telegraph communication had given March 14 as the time 
limit for fitting out transport forces. Fifteen to 
sixteen British submarines continued their surveillance 
in the North Sea on March 14. Jodl doubted if they 
signified that an Allied invasion force was on its way to 
Norway; but on March 15, a number of French officers were 
reported to have arrived in Bergen. The next day tension 
®T W C, X, 769-770. 
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was still high in Berlin in anticipation of a British 
move, but Jodl discounted others' anxiety because the 
9 British had withdrawn seven of their submarines. 
Hitler had "not yet decided how to justify the 
Weser exercise," Jodl entered in his diary on March 14. 
And Grand Admiral Raeder shifted ground expressing doubt 
whether it was "still important to play at preventive 
war in Norway. Evidently, the Commander in Chief of 
the German Navy was no longer too worried about the 
possibility of the Allies violating Norwegian neutrality 
at this juncture, and he questioned if it would not be 
better to proceed with Fall Gelb before Weserillbuna. 
Walter Warlimont stressed his conviction that they could 
now abandon their designs in the North because their 
attack in the West would absorb all available Allied 
troops relieving Germany of any worry about Norway. 
Jodl, however, recognized the danger that Great Britain 
would, in that event, immediately seize "a foothold in 
Narvik, because we would have started with neutrality 
12 violation" in the West. 
^Jodl's Diary, N C A, IV, 392-393. Fuehrer 
Conferences, 1940, I, 22. T W C, X, 796. 
^^Jodl's Diary, N C A, IV, 392. 
^^arlimont. Headquarters, 68. 
^^Jodl's Diary, N C A, IV, 392. 
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It seems that Hitler was influenced enough by this 
new mood of caution to declare: "'To carry out a decision 
of this kind I need absolutely reliable information with 
which I can really justify this decision before the world 
13 and prove that it was necessary,'" As a result, the 
German Intelligence Service was kept busy in the effort 
to ascertain precisely the validity of the reports from 
Norway. At the same time, it was decided in the OKW that 
Fall Gelb would have to take place seven days after 
Wesertlbunq while the possibility of calling off the 
attack on Norway would exist until three days before its 
14 supposed starting date. 
The final plan for Weserflbung Nord envisaged the 
simultaneous establishment of bridgeheads at the leading 
Norwegian harbors with the aim of securing a peaceful 
occupation of Norway. If this failed, the initial German 
invasion force was to paralyze the Norwegian Army's power 
of resistance by seizing its major dispositions which 
were located in close proximity to Norway's maritime 
centers; but its topography precluded any hope of 
completely destroying its army if the Norwegian Government 
chose to oppose the occupation. The primary task of the 
^^Quoted in T M W C, XV, 377. 
14 Haider, Diary, 229. 
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landing teams was to defend the bridgeheads against all 
counterattacks until additional troops and heavy weapons 
could be brought in overland from the major port of 
debarkation, Oslo; but if confronted by superior offensive 
strength, they were to withdraw inland in intact fighting 
order to await reinforcements. If, on the other hand, 
resistance were such that offensive operations would not 
detract from their primary duty, they were to move 
inland seizing the meager lines of communication and 
linking up with forces pushing out from Oslo. 
The appearance of the predominant British Fleet 
would spell the destruction of the German Navy which was 
wholly committed to the operation. Hence success 
depended basically on surprise; and since timing, speed, 
secrecy, deception, and concentration of force (mass) are 
essential elements of surprise. Hitler decided that the 
first wave of 7,850 assault troops was to be transported 
in warships rather than slower troop carriers or cargo 
vessels. This would decrease the time at sea for the 
troops and the danger of discovery, but it would severely 
restrict the individual vessel's fighting capacity on the 
outward voyage. Since all German vessels were liable to 
be sunk after the first landings on "Weser Day," Group XXI 
undertook over the protests of the Navy to dispatch, 
disguised as merchant vessels, a Tanker Echelon and an 
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Export Echelon carrying arms and supplies on W minus six 
days. They were to enter port before the first wave of 
warships. 
Of the Tanker Echelon, two ships assigned to Narvik 
and one to Trondheim were to dock before "Weser Day;" one 
each destined for Bergen, Stavanger, Kristiansand, and 
Oslo were to arrive on W Day. Narvik (three ships), 
Trondheim (two), and Stavanger (one) were the destinations 
for the Export Echelon. This compromised security and 
secrecy; but the staggered departure of fifteen vessels 
of the First Sea Transport Echelon carrying troops in 
uniform and timed to reach harbor on W Day was almost 
inviting trouble. Their destinations were Oslo, 
Kristiansand, Stavanger, and Bergen. The Second and Third 
Sea Transport echelons were to reach Oslo on the second 
and sixth day, respectively, after the invasion while the 
remaining five echelons would use the returning ships for 
their cargoes and troops. 
The warships and assault forces for Norway were 
assigned by groups and destinations as follows: 
Group I: ten destroyers with 2,000 mountain 
troops. 
Narvik. 
Group II: Admiral Hipper and four destroyers; 
700 troops. 
Trondheim. 
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Group III: Kflln and Kflniqsberq (light cruisers), 
Bremse and Karl Peters (special 
service ships), eight torpedo and 
motor torpedo boats; 1,900 troops. 
Bergen. 
Group IV: Karlsruhe (light cruiser), Tsingtau 
(special service ship), ten torpedo 
and motor torpedo boats; 1,100 troops. 
Kristiansand and Arendal. 
Group V: Blticher (heavy cruiser) , Lfltzow 
(pocket battleship), Emden (light 
cruiser), three torpedo boats, eight 
mine sweepers, two armed whalers; 
2,000 troops. 
Oslo. 
Group VI: Four minesweepers; 150 troops. 
Egersund. 
The battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were to serve 
as the covering force for Groups I and II as far north as 
Trondheim where they would sail northwest into the Arctic 
to draw off the British Fleet. Group II was to remain at 
sea waiting for the invasion hour while Group I traveled 
northward to Narvik. Embarkation ports were scattered 
from Stettin and Swinemtinde to Wesermflnde, As an 
additional precautionary measure, the German Navy planned 
to mine the Skagerrak's western approaches; and in 
relation to the Navy, the Luftwaffe was to provide air 
cover when required and to attack all British naval forces 
approaching Norway. 
G F £, VIII, 831-833. Ziemke, Northern Theater, 
26-38. Ruge, Per Seekrieg, 83-85. Raeder, My Life, 309-
310. N C A, Supp. B, 1540-1541. Ibid., IV, 105-106. 
Derry, Campaign, 18-20. 
CHAPTER IX 
THE FINAL PHASE 
After a brief pause, the pace quickened rapidly. 
Enemy intelligence activity in Norway, which had never 
diminished following the termination of the Russo-Finnish 
War, increased after March 20 according to German reports. 
Allied radio messages intercepted by the German 
Intelligence Service presented an alarming picture; and 
it appeared as if their worst fears might quickly be 
realized through an Allied movement into Norway. Yet, 
there seems to have been no inclination on General 
Haider's part to question the delay imposed on Wesertibung 
by Hitler and the shifting of primary interest to action 
against France although he did note that the 214th 
Infantry Division, scheduled to be sent as the sixth and 
final division for Norway, had shifted to Frankfurt on the 
Oder,^ 
^Haider, Diary, 230-233. T W C, X, 780-781 and 
796-797. 
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Complete agreement had not been reached even at 
this late date among the command staffs involved in the 
preparations for Norway. The Luftwaffe, in fact, "did not 
approach with particular enthusiasm this task in the work 
of which not the Air Force, but the not so well liked 
2 Navy, had the leading part." Objections were raised by 
General von Falkenhorst to the "long interval" left 
between the deployment of the naval assault groups beyond 
the harbor entrances in Norway on W Day and the completion 
of diplomatic efforts to obtain the acquiescence of the 
Norwegian Government to an occupation by Germany. Hitler 
refused to permit negotiations to be begun at an earlier 
time on the grounds that appeals for assistance would be 
sent to the Allies. It also would have allowed time for 
the Norwegian Government to alert its coastal defenses. 
The German plenipotentiaries were to emphasize, even to 
exaggerate, in their representations to Oslo and 
3 Copenhagen the military measures which were being taken. 
Falkenhorst was able to lay before Hitler on 
March 20 the news that all preparations for Wesertlbung 
were finished, including final questions about logistics 
and the loading of troop transports. Nevertheless, 
^N C A, IV, 105. 
^Jodl's Diary, N ̂  A, IV, 394. 
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harking back a week to British threats to Norwegian 
neutrality and German iron ore imports, the Chief of the 
Operations Section of the SKL, Rear Admiral Kurt Fricke, 
remained steadfastly opposed to a northern venture and 
went so far as to assert on March 22: 
'An examination of the question as to 
whether a mass encroachment by the 
English into the Norwegian territorial 
waters was so immediately imminent that 
it might represent a danger to present 
German shipping produces the opinion 
that this is not to be expected at the 
present time. The ore transports are 
to be continued, as no losses have yet 
occurred.'^ 
Fricke disagreed with Raeder concerning the entire 
question. He thought that the British should be permitted 
to invade Norway and then be driven out by a German 
counterattack through southern Norway and Sweden. Raeder 
totally rejected his subordinate's view as "a completely 
5 distorted idea." It is true that this would have 
required Germany's commitment on a new front operating 
against an entrenched foe in rugged mountain terrain 
ill-supplied with means of communication, while the enemy 
could be supplied by sea across waters which were under 
its own direct control. Raeder apparently "forgot" in his 
dismissal of this alternate conception that the existing 
"^Quoted in T M W C, XIV, 188. N C A, Supp. B, 1540. 
M W C, XIV, 188. 
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naval plans envisioned opening the very front to which he 
was opposed—albeit, on the supposition that Germans 
would constitute the occupying force which would have to 
be dislodged. 
The question of exact timing now assumed paramount 
importance; and although the decision of if-and-when to 
carry out Wesertibung was a political question of the 
highest order, the determination of the date and time had 
to be based on calculations made by the Navy. Lengthening 
days in Central and Northern Norway under the influence of 
the approaching Arctic summer would endanger any surprise 
attack after the middle of April, In addition, because it 
would be the last day when some Northern Lights would 
precede the dawn along the Norwegian coast, April 8 was 
chosen for the start of the operation. Navy meteorologists 
determined that between 5:15 and 5:30 A. M. would be the 
most propitious time for entering the harbors since it 
would be dark until 5:15 but almost daylight after 5:30 
due to the strong midnight sun, especially at Narvik. 
Assault teams sent ashore in motorboats would have to 
seize the coast defenses all within this fifteen minute 
period. Ice in the Baltic Sea turned out to be a delaying 
factor; and when some ships sustained propeller damage 
from ice, the date of the operation was put off one day. 
The Navy and Falkenhorst as Commanding General of Group XXI 
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approved these arrangements, and together they submitted 
them to Hitler who likewise approved their determinations. 
Everything agreed, incidentally, "with all the desires of 
the Navy. 
On March 24 and 25, the British began to interfere 
with German merchant shipping in Norwegian and Danish 
territorial waters and even went so far as to fire on 
them, according to Jodl. The following day Hitler 
discussed the deadline for the pending operation; but Jodl 
7 remarked, "Fuehrer stxcks to it: first Weser exercise..." 
Fall Gelb would follow in four or five days. The necessity 
of dark nights to cover naval movements was noted during 
the conference; but since the new moon would be on 
April 7, this posed no problem. Moreover, the continu­
ation of winter weather conditions along the Norwegian 
coast—fog and resulting low visibility together with the 
low pressure storm cells—would be to the advantage of the 
8 German forces. 
In spite of Britain's fresh encroachments on 
Norwegian neutrality, Raeder announced to Hitler during 
this conference on March 25, "In my opinion the danger of 
^N C A, Supp. B, 1540-1541. T W C, X, 781. N C A, 
IV, 106. Raeder, My Life, 309. Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, 
I, 22-23. 
^Jodl's Diary, N C A, IV, 394. See also D G F P, 
IX, 35. 
^Jodl's Diary, N C A, IV, 394. Fuehrer Conferences, 
1940, I, 22-23. Raeder, My Life, 309. 
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a British landing in Norway is no longer acute at 
present." He thought that Great Britain would continue 
her infringements of neutral waters in the attempt to cut 
the flow of ore from Narvik and Kirkenes, however, and 
that she would try to create incidents which would give 
her an excuse for taking action against Norway. Thus, 
the immediate danger of a British invasion disappeared 
from among Raeder's repertory of reasons for invading 
Norway. The argument of necessity, based on the 
elemental fact of the changing of the seasons on which 
success depended, took its place. Raeder asserted 
categorically to Hitler: 
Sooner or later Germany will be faced 
with the necessity of carrvincr omt 
operation 'Weseruebung'. Therefore it 
is advisable to do so as soon as 
possible, by 15 April at the latest, 
since after that date the nights are 
too short. 
Yet, continued postponement would be dangerous if the 
operation were eventually ordered; and in the naval view, 
something had to be done soon because delay was hindering 
the operational effectiveness of the Navy by tying up 
practically all of their major, active surface craft in 
port and the submarines stationed off Norwegian harbors 
q 
Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, I, 22. See also War 
Diary of the Naval War Staff, March 26, in T W X, 765. 
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could hold their positions for only two or three more 
weeks. Raeder advocated the immediate laying of aerial 
mines in connection with Wesertlbung to help relieve some 
of the pressure from the British Navy without receiving 
the Ftlhrer' s consent. Hitler wanted "to think it over 
some more" before ordering Wesertlbung to commence although 
he had already given his approval to the starting date. 
The next day Hitler told Haider that he wanted it to begin 
on either April 9 or 10.^^ 
A German submarine, the U-21, went aground near 
Lindesnaes, Norway, on March 27 and was interned by 
Norwegian authorities. Ambassador Bra.uer reported the 
next day from Oslo that the Norwegian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Halvdan Koht, had informed him, while discussing 
the U-21, that the English appeared to be interested in 
provoking Germany into taking hostile action against 
Norway so that they could be free to enter Norwegian 
waters without shouldering the responsibility for 
violating their neutrality without just cause. "The 
future will show whether Foreign Minister Koht sees things 
entirely correctly," BrSuer telegraphed. "It definitely 
^^Jodl's Diary, N C A, IV, 394. Fuehrer Conferences, 
1940, I, 22-27. 
^^Halder, Diary, 237. 
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appears," he went on, 
as I have frequently pointed out, that the 
English have no intention of landing,^2 
but that they want to disturb shipping in 
Norwegian territorial waters, perhaps, as 
Koht thinks, in order to provoke Germany. 
It was also possible that a repetition of the previous 
week's attacks by the British on German ore shipping in 
Norwegian waters would become increasingly regular and 
intense, but BrSuer still believed that "the firm inten­
tion of Norway to maintain her neutrality and to insure 
that Norway's neutrality rules are respected can be 
accepted as a fact." The Norwegian Government had also 
issued an order to fire to their antiaircraft crews and 
Navy. Great Britain had been informed of this, BrSuer 
explained, when the Norwegian representatives in London 
had officially protested to His Majesty's Government on 
March 25 against their violation of Norwegian sovereignty 
13 by attacking German shipping in Norwegian waters. 
The same day on which this communique arrived in 
Berlin, General Jodl revealed that dissenting voices in 
the Navy and Group XXI remained unconvinced. "Individual 
naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning the Weser 
12 This was incorrect. British strategic planning 
continued apace with the German in March 1940. For an 
accurate assessment, see Churchill, Gathering Storm, 531-
560 and Derry, Campaign, 9-16 and 21-24. 
G F P, IX, 35-36. See also N C A, Supp. A, 
965-966. 
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exercise and need stimulus," wrote Jodl; and "the three 
matters, which are none of their business. Krancke sees 
more disadvantages than advantages." "In the evening," 
Jodl related, "the Fuehrer steps into the map room and 
explains sharply that he will not be content with the Navy 
again quitting the Norwegian ports right away." The 
warships were to stay in the harbors of Narvik, Trondheim, 
and Oslo in order to avoid a "bad impression on ground 
14 forces" and to assist xn setting up defense batteries. 
with the decisions reached during Hitler's March 5 confer­
ence. During a private conversation about this issue, 
Hitler repeated his views to the Grand Admiral on why the 
ships had to be retained. Raeder recited the reasons 
against it which he had already made very clear on repeated 
occasions: the destroyers could be trapped in the fjord 
at Narvik by a superior naval force and annihilated; the 
troops could seek protection on land, and steamers would be 
supplying them with the necessary heavy weapons; neither 
Narvik nor Trondheim possessed anchorages protected against 
submarines; immediate withdrawal was the only feasible solu­
tion if the warships were not to be caught by superior 
British forces. Faced with these arguments. Hitler gave in 
chiefs of Falkenhorst's st are also pondering 
This was contrary to Raeder's wishes but in line 
14 Jodl's Diary, N C A, IV, 395. Fuehrer 
Conferences, 1940, I, 29. 
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but only as far as Narvik was concerned. Raeder agreed to 
15 investigate the question of Trondheim again. 
In the general conference with Keitel and Jodl on 
March 29, Raeder asked Hitler for a definitive decision on 
the laying of aerial mines. Goering had agreed to lay them 
the night before but arbitrarily and without explanation 
had cancelled the order for them and all other mine-laying 
operations connected with Wesertibuncf. Mining Scapa Flow 
was an integral part of the operation, Raeder held; and 
Hitler said that he would take care of the matter with 
Goering personally. As another precautionary measure, the 
Commander in Chief of the Navy suggested that the question 
of the U-21's internment should not be pushed too strongly 
with Norway in order to deprive Great Britain of any excuse 
to act,^^ In other words, Raeder was implicitly admitting 
that Germany did not have to fear a British invasion as 
long as she maintained a correct attitude toward Norway. 
His old saw of an impending British seizure of Norwegian 
bases had flown out the window. 
General von Falkenhorst and all other commanding 
officers taking part in Wesertlbung discussed the operation 
with Hitler in minute detail on April 1 from 11 A. M. to 
7 P. M. Goering remained sulking in his mental tent and 
displayed little interest in the discussions. Brauchitsch 
failed to participate at all. On April 2, 1940, Goering, 
15 
Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, I, 29. 
^^Ibid., 28. 
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Falkenhorst, and Raeder again met with Hitler and con­
firmed that all preparations had been completed. 
Obstinate to the end, Goering raised objections to the 
rapid retreat of German war vessels from Norwegian harbors. 
Raeder had won his case. Hitler expressed equal disapprov­
al but said that he did "not want to intervene too much in 
an exclusive concern of naval warfare." The ships were 
17 allowed to withdraw immediately. 
All deliberations concerning the operation were 
terminated. The Fillhrer and Supreme Commander of the 
German Armed Forces Adolf Hitler then issued a personal 
directive with the code words ordering the execution of 
1 R 
Wesertlbunq at 5:15 A. M. on April 9, 1940. 
^^Jodl's Diary, N C A, IV, 396. 
1 ft 
Ibid., 395-396. N C A, Supp. B, 1542-1543. 
D G F IX, 66-67. The story of how the invasion was 
carried out and the subsequent campaign in Norway success­
fully effected is too complex for a brief consideration 
here and beyond the purview of this study. For an inter­
esting and detailed survey of Vidkun Quisling's partici­
pation in this entire episode, see Daniel W. Younker's 
The Background of the German Invasion of Norway in 1940; 
The Role of Vidkun Quisling (Unpublished Master's thesis, 
University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska, 1959). For 
studies of the hostilities, the distribution of military 
forces, and the deployment of troops at the conclusion of 
warfare in Norway, consult T. K. Derry, The Campaign in 
Norway (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952); 
Earl F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, 
1940-1945 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government 
Printing Office, I960), 32-108; and Winston S. Churchill, 
The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1948), 579-657. For an instructive, though brief, 
examination of Wesertibung, see Gary Allen Burden, The German 
Navy and Adolf Hitler, 1933-1945 (Unpublished Master's 
thesis, Montana State University, Missoula, Montana, 1965), 
70-94. 
EPILOGUE 
Varying assessments characterize the outcome of 
Germany's successful occupation of Norway between April 9 
and June 10, 1940, against Norwegian resistance and an 
Allied counteroffensive. They range from Franz Haider's 
conclusion that "the Norwegian affair" was one of 
"Hitler's strategic achievements" which "as a whole must 
be booked to the credit side"^ and F. H. Kinsley's that 
"Hitler's strategy up to the fall of France was...not 
merely defensible; it was, _in all the circumstances, 
eminently sound and correct" and "also eminently success-
2 ful" —to the vxew that if not a strategic failure, the 
occupation of Norway was at least "a grave strategic 
„3 error. 
^Franz Haider, Hitler as War Lord (Trans. Paul 
Findlay, London: Putnam, 1950), 32. 
2 My italics. F. H. Hinsley, Hitler's Strategy 
(Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1951), 52. 
3 Stefan T. Possony, "Decision Without Battle," 
United States Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis, 
Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1946), LXXII, 764. 
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As a leading, Norwegian military theoretician 
4 recently pointed out, physical control of Scandinavia 
was not of primary concern to Germany. Denying such 
control, or even preponderant influence, to another 
foreign power was. 
Laying aside questions of responsibility and 
guilt, and ends versus means, as well as the attempt to 
define the point at which an officer's duty to acquaint 
his commander with an impending danger and the necessity 
for offensive action passes into unbounded desire for 
territorial and/or military aggrandizement, the fact 
remains that Raeder's advocacy of a northern operation, 
augmented by the very real danger of an Allied inter­
vention in Norden, prompted Hitler to undertake 
preparations for Wesertlbung. Hopefully, the preceding 
pages have tempered T. K. Berry's conclusion that "Hitler 
himself regarded the operation primarily as a preventive 
5 measure." Reference has to be made only to Hitler's 
search for a means of justifying the operation after the 
cessation of the Russo-Finnish War, his acceptance of 
4 " Nils Orvik, Europe's Northern Cap and the Soviet 
Union (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Center for International Affairs, 1963), 19-20. 
5 Derry, Campaign. 17. 
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Raeder's views expressed to him on March 26, and his 
decision to execute Weser<lbunq in order to convey 
something of his aggressive, though cautious, mood. The 
official British announcement on April 8, 1940, of 
hostile moves taken against Norwegian neutrality, the 
laying of a minefield north of Bodfl at the mouth of 
Vestfjord at 4:30 A. M., and information captured later 
of the planned Allied occupation of Norway^ verified 
Raeder's early concern as well as the correctness, in the 
eyes of Hitler at least, of the course which Raeder had 
first proposed, then pursued, and had finally seen 
translated into action. Whatever may be the final judgment 
of history regarding Wesertlbuncr, it will be forced to 
acknowledge the positive leadership of this man despite 
his occasional vacillation both in its conception and 
fulfillment. 
This was the only major operation conducted by the 
Armed Forces of the Third Reich which was not conceived 
in Hitler's fertile mind, and it laid bare his failure 
7 as a "Great Captain" foreshadowing later command crises. 
^German Foreign Office, Britain's Designs on Norway; 
Documents Concerning the Anglo-French Policy of Extending 
the War (New York: German Library of Information, 1940). 
7 Hitler panicked when the issue was in doubt at 
Narvik. See Jodl' s Diary, N C. A, IV, 398-404 and 
Warlimont, Headquarters, 76-80. 
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Wesertlbunq also demonstrated for the first time in combat 
that a land-based air force possessing air superiority 
could nullify naval superiority and that troops could be 
effectively transported by air to the most forward battle 
areas. 
The operation thus vindicated Raeder's and the 
German Navy's reliance on surprise combined with military 
initiative and airpower, in lieu of supremacy at sea. To 
this was added the leaven of luck. That Wesertlbunq 
achieved political, strategic, and tactical surprise is 
beyond doubt; and the gains for Germany were immense. 
Great Britain and France were excluded from Scandinavia; 
the iron ore supplies were safeguarded; the Baltic Sea was 
secured; what Hitler called "a wider start-line against 
Britain" was obtained; and Germany had broken the 
constricting bonds of the British naval blockade. It was, 
8 however, a tactical naval defeat; but one which Raeder 
and the Navy had anticipated. To Raeder and Jodl, more­
over, the loss seemed a small price to pay in return for 
the advantages and security which had been obtained. 
g 
Germany lost the heavy cruiser Bltlcher, two light 
cruisers, ten destroyers, six submarines, and several 
smaller vessels. Two battleships fScharnhorst and 
Gneisenau), one heavy and one light cruiser, and the 
pocket battleship Ltttzow were damaged. 
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Although Germany's overall tactical success in 
Norway is unquestioned, a definitive conclusion regarding 
the strategic import of Wesertlbunq remains elusive. 
The "key" to the German invasion is to be found in the 
transshipment of Swedish iron ore via Narvik and the Leads 
to Germany. Danger to this vital traffic found expression 
throughout the planning for WeserflbunQ in the desire to 
safeguard these imports as well as to forestall any 
British takeover. Nevertheless, when he concluded that 
the operation was "a grave strategic error," Stefan T. 
Possony totally disregarded this critical factor in his 
9 analysis. The economic exploitation of Norway during the 
remainder of the war, however, was subordinate in value to 
the securing of Swedish ore. Another factor, the impact 
on neutral opinion of the seeming invincibility of German 
arms, was forgotten after the stupendous German victories 
in France and the Low Countries. 
These were, of course, in the future; and even the 
most sanguine optimists in the German Armed Forces during 
April 1940 scarcely anticipated the magnitude and rapidity 
of their later success. Thus, the contentions that 
Germany should have welcomed a dispersal of Allied 
strength into Scandinavia and that the Allies could 
9 Possony, "Decision Without Battle," 754. 
127 
subsequently have been thrown out or would have evacuated 
Norway benefit from hindsight and seem overdrawn in the 
military planning context of early 1940 which could not 
ignore the fact of Germany's unprotected northern flank 
and the disparity in naval power. One is equally free to 
speculate whether Fall Gelb would have been carried out if 
Great Britain and France had previously occupied Norway 
with increasing strength and, if it had taken place on 
schedule, whether Fall Gelb would have succeeded as it 
did with German forces diverted to protect their northern 
areas and presumably also sent into Norway and Sweden. 
Forsaking such reveries, the victories in the West 
opened up new air and naval bases which correspondingly 
diminished the strategic value of Norwegian bases for 
Germany although the northern outlet to the Atlantic Ocean 
remained important and Norway provided bases from which to 
attack Allied convoys to Murmansk. Naval engagements 
during the invasion of Norway, however, left Germany 
with only four destroyers, two light cruisers, and one 
heavy cruiser undamaged—a force which "was no factor in 
the supreme issue of the invasion of Britain. 
On the other hand, Wesertlbung so extended the sweep 
of German power that Great Britain's defensive capabilities 
^"^Churchill, Gathering Storm, 557. 
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were severely taxed; and Hitler could have recouped the 
diminution of his Navy by securing the French Fleet for 
the Third Reich.By the very threat inherent in its 
geographical position, Norway multiplied the remaining 
potentiality of the German Navy; and the presence of 
German capital ships and other units in Norwegian waters 
created the strategically important factor of a "fleet 
in being" outflanking Britain's defenses in the north. 
Yet, the naval losses which Weserflbung had incurred not 
only eliminated the German Navy from participation in 
Fall Gelb but also prevented Germany from capitalizing 
effectively on the strategic and geographic position which 
had been won for her. Herein lies the element of failure 
in the long-term strategic significance of Wesertlbuncr. 
Military planning does not benefit from an Oracle 
at Delphi. Consequently, the risks taken and the resultant 
losses do not detract from the absolute strategic value of 
Norway. In the final analysis, it offered the advantage 
of an extended front from which to deploy for a 
simulated invasion of Great Britain and to stage whatever 
diversionary moves might be feasible, thereby compounding 
the problems of defense for a badly battered Britain. 
^^For American concern with this very possibility, 
consult Richard James Champoux, Liberal Critics of the 
United States Policy Toward the Vichy Government, 1940-1943 
(Unpublished Master's thesis, Montana State University, 
Missoula, Montana, 1959), 5-32. 
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That Wesertibung resulted in a diminution of the German 
Navy's striking power was, however, only the verso side 
of a very negotiable coin. Wesertlbung was, in fine, both 
a strategic and tactical victory and a strategic 
miscalculation—those who throw the iron dice can afford 
very few mistakes. 
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